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1 Introduction 
This technical report is one of the deliverables for a NASA-sponsored research project where an 
innovative approach to hazard analysis and safety assurance based on systems and control theory 
is being demonstrated, evaluated, and compared both to the more traditional approaches from 
decades past as well as newer certification approaches used by the FAA and EUROCONTROL. 
The overall goal is to develop more powerful tools for assuring aircraft and airspace safety as 
changes are made in the National Airspace System. 
Traditional approaches to safety analysis assume that accidents are caused by component 
failures. They therefore focus on reliability analysis techniques, particularly fault tree or event 
tree analysis. The goal is to determine scenarios of component failures that together will lead to 
an accident or loss event. Failures may be single or multiple and are usually assumed to be 
random. After the component failure scenarios are identified, engineers use fault tolerance or 
fail-safe techniques to protect against hazards caused by the identified failures and to increase 
individual component integrity. A fly-fix-fly approach augments the design techniques with 
investigation of accidents in great depth and recommendations made from the results to prevent 
reoccurrences. 
     This approach has been very effective in the past because there have been relatively few 
changes in the basic aircraft or air traffic control design; the systems are relatively simple; 
technology has changed slowly; engineers have been able to use very conservative design 
approaches; and the system components can be effectively decoupled so that interactions can be 
anticipated, simplified, and guarded against. This approach, by itself, is becoming less effective, 
however, as these assumptions start to be violated.  
     Software is increasingly an important part of systems and allows enormously more complex 
systems to be constructed. The potential for accidents arising from unsafe interactions among 
non-failed components, i.e., unplanned systems and software behavior, is increasing. NextGen 
components, for example, may involve more than just one aircraft and one onboard system but 
rather span aircraft, ground controllers, space-based systems, and communication links between 
aircraft. The traditional hardware-oriented safety engineering techniques focusing on failures do 
not handle these types of new accident causes.   
     In addition, humans are changing from direct control to assuming supervisory roles over 
automation, which requires more cognitively complex human decision-making. Like software, 
the changing roles of pilots and ground controllers introduces the potential for new causes of 
accidents that are not well handled by today’s failure-oriented and hardware-oriented 
approaches.  
     To deal with these new accident causes, we have developed a more comprehensive accident 
causality model based on systems theory as well as analysis tools constructed from this new 
model. The model and tools include the causes of accidents considered in the past, but also 
consider the new accident causality factors that are increasingly occurring today. 
     In this report, a comparison is made of the approach and results of our new systems-theoretic 
approach to safety assurance and certification with the safety analysis and certification approach 
being used for NextGen procedures. For this case study, we selected a new ATC procedure, 
called ATSA-ITP (Airborne Traffic Situational Awareness In-Trail Procedures) because the 
safety analysis had already been performed and safety requirements generated. We then 
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performed our own analysis using our new systems-theoretic approach. We first describe and 
critique the results of the ITP safety analysis documented in DO-312 (Safety, Performance and 
Interoperability Requirements Document for the In-Trail Procedure in the Oceanic Airspace 
(ATSA-ITP) Application) [4]. We then describe our new approach and the results. Finally, we 
conclude with a summary of the results.  
2 Safety and Hazard Analysis Techniques for NextGen 
In this section, a brief introduction to the case study is first presented and then the methods used 
to assure its safety by the FAA and Eurocontrol in DO-312. The next section describes the new 
approach and its results. The last section of the report provides a formal comparison of the two 
approaches to certifying the safety of NextGen components. 
2.1 Background: NextGen and ATSA-ITP 
According to the FAA, NextGen represents the transformation of the National Airspace System 
through an “evolution from the ground-based systems of air traffic control to a satellite-based 
system of air traffic management” [9]. The overarching goals of NextGen are to (1) reduce flight 
delays by improving airport operations; (2) improve aviation’s impact on the environment 
through reduced CO2 emissions and fuel use; and (3) make the airspace safer via more precise 
tracking, improved information-sharing, and implementing a Safety Management System [10]. 
Airborne Traffic Situational Awareness In-Trail Procedure (ATSA-ITP, referred to herein as just 
ITP) is designed to achieve these objectives by enabling “aircraft that desire Flight Level 
changes in Procedural Airspace to achieve these changes on a more frequent basis, thus 
improving flight efficiency while maintaining safe seperation [sic] from other aircraft” [4]. ITP, 
within the larger framework of NextGen and its European counterpart SESAR, provides a real-
world case study with which to compare the safety assurance philosophy and analytical 
techniques being proposed to those of the FAA, EUROCONTROL, and their associated 
organizations.  
2.2  DO-312 Description 
The purpose of DO-312 is to provide “the minimum operational, safety, and performance 
requirements and interoperability requirements for the implementation of enhanced Airborne 
Traffic Situational Awareness for ‘In-Trail Procedure’” [4]. These requirements can be used for 
approval processes for hardware, software, and operational procedures including aircraft type 
design, aircraft operator approval, and Air Traffic Services (ATS). It is essentially a 
performance-based safety assurance document, where the appropriate1 parts of the NAS must 
show compliance with minimal, quantitative functional performance levels. Development of the 
document can be broken into three basic parts: (1) Operational Services and Environment 
Description, (2) Safety and Performance Requirements, and (3) Interoperability Requirements. 
Each of theses parts is described below. 
                                                 
1Considerationof,andagreementonwhatisdeemedappropriateforthiskindofsystemisnotnecessarily
straightforward,asourcomparisonandcritiqueinSection4suggests.
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2.2.1   Operational Services and Environment Description (OSED) 
The OSED is concerned with developing and describing the services, functions, and procedures 
necessary to facilitate the ultimate goal of enabling an increased rate of Flight Level changes in 
Procedural (in this case transoceanic) Airspace. This part of the document defines the system 
architecture and the necessary stakeholders involved in operation. Appendix A of [4] provides an 
informative, detailed description of the ITP design along with several examples and the context 
in which the procedure should occur. A brief description and example is included here to assist 
the reader: 
“For a standard Flight Level change, the controller uses standard, procedure-based 
separation minima and procedures to ensure that separation will exist between an aircraft 
requesting a Flight Level change and all other aircraft at the initial, intermediate and 
requested Flight Levels. The ATSA-ITP was developed to enable either leading or 
following Same Track aircraft to perform a climb or descent to a requested Flight Level 
through Intervening Flight Levels that might otherwise be disallowed when using current 
standard separation minima. The ITP Equipment would allow the flight crew to 
determine if the criteria for an ITP request are met with respect to one or two Reference 
Aircraft at Intervening Flight Levels……Once these criteria are met, the flight crew may 
request an ITP, identifying the Reference Aircraft in the request. ATC would verify that 
the ITP and Reference Aircraft were Same Track and that the maximum Closing Mach 
Differential was not exceeded……If the controller then determines that separation 
minima will be met with all Other Aircraft, the climb or descent request may be granted. 
The controller does not determine or verify the separation distance from the Reference 
Aircraft.” [4] 
     An example of one the six potential ITP maneuver geometries follows in Figure 1. 

 
Figure 1:  ITP Following-Climb [4] 
     OSED further defines the procedural means by which ITP must occur. It consists of four 
phases: the initiation phase, instruction phase, execution phase, and termination phase. From [4]: 
1. ITP Initiation phase: The preparation for performing the application consists of realizing 
the desire and assessing the appropriateness for requesting an ITP maneuver by the flight 
crew. This includes the identification of the Reference Aircraft in the procedure and 
transmission of the ITP request to the ground controller. 
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2. ITP Instruction phase: The ITP clearance is issued by the controller, and reevaluated by 
the flight crew. 
3. ITP Execution phase: The cleared ITP Aircraft performs the ITP maneuver, maintaining 
the required rate of climb/descent and speed as directed by the ITP clearance. Conducting 
an ITP maneuver is similar operationally to standard climbing/descending maneuvers. 
4. ITP Termination phase: The procedure is terminated once the ITP Aircraft has achieved 
the requested Flight Level or an abnormal event results in premature termination of the 
ITP maneuver. 
2.2.2   Safety and Performance Requirements (SPR) 
Using the operational environment, or OSED, DO-312 derives safety and performance 
requirements via a Collision Risk Model of the expected state vectors of aircraft in the ATSA-
ITP airspace, Operational Performance Assessment of all the surveillance aspects needed to 
satisfy the assumptions in the Collision Risk Model, and an Operational Safety Assessment of 
the potential hazards to which the constituents may be exposed.  
     We briefly reviewed the Collision Risk Model and are assuming that the analysis has been 
done rigorously and correctly. We also assume the associated Operational Performance 
Assessment appropriately correlates with the risk model. This report focuses on the safety/hazard 
analysis. 
     Figure 2 shows the connectivity between the various elements of the safety analysis, called 
the Operational Safety Assessment (OSA). The descriptions of these elements are provided from 
[4]: 
 In the center of the model stands the Operational Hazard (OH), both expressed for the 
detected and undetected case at the boundary of the application. Hazards are identified by 
operational personnel using the application description and associated phases and actions 
as a reference, along with a consideration of potential abnormal events. 
 On the right-hand side resides the Operational Hazard Assessment (OHA), from the 
boundary of the application up to the operational effects on the airspace. The OHA 
objective is to set the Safety Objective for the OH (for both the detected and undetected 
case). External Mitigation Means, identified in the OHA and used in the determination of 
the Safety Objectives, are converted into Operational Requirements in the OSED. 
 The left-hand side depicts the Allocation of Safety Objectives and Requirements (ASOR) 
process, located inside the application. The objective of this activity is to allocate safety 
requirements to the airborne and ground domain in order to meet the safety objectives for 
each operational hazard. This is achieved by the identification of the Basic Causes 
leading to each hazard, their combination (shown in a Fault Tree) and the derived 
requirements. Internal Mitigation Means are identified to ensure the Safety Objectives are 
met; these become Safety Requirements if they are technical or Operational 
Requirements if they are procedural. 
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Figure 2:  OSA Process Overview [4] 
     The Operational Hazard Assessment (OHA) on the right side of Figure 2 merits further 
description, as it provides a basis for comparison with the methods developed by MIT as well as 
other standards used throughout the aviation industry and other domains. There are four steps to 
conducting the OHA used in DO-312: (1) identify hazards, (2) allocate severity classes, (3) 
determine probability of occurrence (Pe), and (4) assign a safety objective. Figure 3 and the 
outline below describe this process flow along with brief definitions of the terms. 
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Figure 3:  OHA Process Flow [4] 
 
1. Identify Operational Hazards (OH): An OH is defined as an event that may arise when 
the system is in a faulted mode2 
a. Obtain list of Abnormal Events (AE) by applying failure modes 
i. Loss: Action not provided 
ii. Incorrect: Action performed incorrectly 
iii. Others: Action executed in non-suitable conditions or out of sequence 
b. Perform an expert analysis: Brainstorming sessions with air traffic controllers and 
pilots (used to complete and validate Step 1a) 
c. Identify Basic Causes (BC) and Abnormal Events (AE) that can lead to an OH 
i. System failures, human errors, procedure dysfunctions or failures and 
conditions external to the application itself (such as GPS constellation 
failure) 
ii. BCs lead to safety requirements or assumptions 
2. Hazard Assessment and Severity Class allocation 
a. Describe the operational environment (OSED) 
i. Environmental Conditions (EC): Characteristics of the environment in 
which the application is expected to be used 
ii. External Mitigation Means: Mitigation means (mainly procedures) that 
help to “reduce” the hazard effects 
b. Classify hazards 
i. Effect on operations, occupants, air crew, air traffic service, specific 
effects 
                                                 
2WeareunsureexactlywhatthisdefinitionofanOHmeansasitisnotwelldefinedinthereport,butitappearsto
simplybeaneventthatfollowssomefailure.Theredoesnotseemtobeanytietoanaccidentorincident,whichis
theusualdefinitionofahazard.
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ii. Rate 1 (most severe) to 5 (least severe) 
3. Determine probability “Pe” and apportion the ATM risk budget: Define Risk 
Classification Scheme or Safety Targets. ST1 is assigned to Severity Class 1 and has 
lowest occurrence rate (1E-08/flt-hr), ST1 is assigned to Severity Class 2, and so on. 
4. Assign Safety Objective:  SOj = min (STi / Peij), i.e. the minimum of the safety target 
divided by the probability for each event tree leaf and each OH. 
DO-312 derives safety requirements through a process called Allocation of Safety Objectives 
and Requirements (ASOR), which is a continuation of the above four steps. 
5. Fault Tree Development 
a. Use information from OSED 
b. Query operational and system experts 
6. Allocate safety objective and ASOR  
a. Validate results from Step 5 
b. Explore risk mitigation strategies 
7. Derive Safety Requirements from basic causes (fault trees) 
2.2.3   Interoperability Requirements 
Interoperability requirements (INTEROP) are intended to ensure that the elements employed for 
the ATSA-ITP application work together correctly. INTEROP requirements specify the 
exchange of data between the elements of the airspace system that will be used for ITP, 
including ADS-B applications between transmitting and receiving aircraft involved in the 
procedure. These requirements are also intended to specify the exchange of data between aircraft 
and ground domains but (intentionally) do not contain detailed operational requirements for 
avionics and ground equipment. 
2.3   Critique of DO-312 Methodology 
We have identified several problems with this approach. First, the safety assessment is based on 
the nominal cases outlined in the OSED and then tries to predict a probability of deviation from 
nominal. Section 3 and [8] describe the potential danger of this type of approach, which is based 
on expected incorrect behavior (called a “design basis accident” in the nuclear power 
community) rather than worst case analysis. Starting with a hazard (as usually defined rather 
than the definition used in DO-312) and assuming worst-case system behavior has the potential 
of identifying a greater set of contingencies for “off-nominal” behavior.  
2.3.1  Hazard Definition 
DO-312 begins its analysis with non-traditional definitions for safety-related terms. For example, 
Operational Hazard is defined in two different ways in the document: 
1) An event that may arise when the system is in a faulted mode.3 Events leading to an OH 
are called its Basic Causes and Abnormal Events, and can either be system failures, 
                                                 
3Theterm“systemfaultedmode”isnotdefined.
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human errors, procedure dysfunctions or failures, or conditions external to the 
application itself. 
2) Any condition, event, or circumstance that could induce an operational effect4 [4] 

     The process used to identify the ITP safety requirements in DO-312 uses the first “faulted 
mode” definition and defines abnormal events as arising due to system failures, human errors, 
procedural issues, and/or external conditions. The severity of the hazard is then determined by 
the effect it may have on the system. Defining hazards as abnormal events or events that arise 
when a system is in a faulted mode leads to defining all system failures as hazards, not just those 
that can lead to a loss (accident or incident). Essentially, safety and reliability are incorrectly 
equated. For example, one hazard identified in DO-312 is that ATC incorrectly rejects an ITP 
clearance (and therefore, the ITP is not executed). Although such an event is not desirable, it is 
not unsafe. Furthermore, this definition leads to important omissions of unsafe states, which will 
be explained in the following sections. As Figure 4 shows, while some failure scenarios are 
unsafe, some are safe, and some unsafe scenarios lie outside the realm of a “failure”. 

 
Figure 4: The DO-312 Approach to Hazard Definition 
     While definitions of standard engineering terms used for decades can be changed, such new 
definitions that conflict with standard practice and the FAA's own guidelines for safety 
assessment [3] can lead to serious problems. At the least, communication can be inhibited and, at 
worst, operational safety can be degraded. A more standard definition of hazard is a system state 
that, together with a particular set of environment conditions, will result in an unplanned or 
undesired loss (i.e., an accident). Using the standard hazard definition leads to the identification 
of more and different hazards and hazard causes for ITP, capturing the unsafe scenarios 
illustrated in Figure 4. 


                                                 
4DefinitionofoperationaleffectinDO312:Thepotentialultimateresultofahazard.Theseverityoftheeffectis
reducedbyexternalmitigationswhentheyareavailable.
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2.3.2   Hazard Identification 
Another set of issues with the DO-312 methodology concerns the use of a chain-of-event 
accident causality model in identifying causes and hazards. This model (and resulting hazard 
analysis techniques) puts an emphasis on preventing or reducing failures and also tacitly assumes 
that failure modes are independent. As noted in [5],[6],[7], and elsewhere, components need not 
fail in order to induce hazardous behavior at the system level. Fault trees do little to capture 
component interactions or the emergent nature of safety in complex systems.  
     DO-312 identifies six operational hazards that are used in the ITP safety assurance. To 
identify the hazards, abnormal events were found by applying failure modes to each expected 
action throughout the ITP phases. Each abnormal event is then traced forward in time to create a 
chain of events that leads to an outcome such as an accident or inconvenience. An event from 
each chain is then selected and labeled as an operational hazard.5 Note that the same operational 
hazard may appear in more than one chain of events. 
 
Figure 5: Chain of Events Model Used in DO-312 for Hazard Identification 
Figure 5 shows the generic chain of events model used, and Table 1 shows the operational 
hazards that were identified. 

Table 1: Operational Hazards from DO-312 Table C.6 
OH1:InterruptionofanITPmaneuver
OH2:ExecutionofanITPclearancenotcompliantwith
ITPCriteria
OH3:ITPrequestnotacceptedbyATC.(flightcrew
requestsITPbuttherequestisdeniedbyATC.)
OH4:RejectionbytheflightcrewofanITPclearance
notcompliantwiththeITPCriteria
OH5:RejectionbytheflightcrewofanITPclearance
compliantwiththeITPCriteria.
OH6:IncorrectexecutionofanITPmaneuver.
 

This process identified OH-3, OH-4, and OH-5 in Table 1 as operational hazards, but they are 
noted to “have no effect on safety” and therefore are not analyzed. In fact, OH-4 is exactly what 
                                                 
5Theseconditionsappeartocorrespondtothe“boundaryofapplication”inDO312.
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should happen, so it is difficult to understand why this was identified as a hazard. OH-2 and OH-
6 are identified as having the potential for gravest impact, and became the focus of the ITP safety 
analysis along with OH-1 to a lesser extent. 
     The process of tracing abnormal events forward in time to identify operational hazards 
involves an arbitrary choice of which event in the chain is considered the operational hazard. 
DO-312 states that operational hazards are “identified along the boundary of the application 
under assessment”. Although this criterion is not explicitly defined for ITP, it appears that 
operational hazards were selected such that one or more attributes in Table 2 were known.6 
Notice that every operational hazard is written as a combination of one or more of these 
attributes. For example, OH-3 is comprised of the attributes {(ATC evaluation of ITP = Denied), 
(ITP clearance = compliant)}. 
     Every operational hazard is written in terms of one or more of these conditions, and each 
hazard assumes that an ITP request has already been made. For example, OH-3 describes the set 
of conditions {(ATC evaluation of ITP = Denied), (ITP clearance = compliant)}. Clearly, not 
every possible combination of attributes is hazardous. However, there are several hazardous 
combinations that are not covered by the operational hazards in Table 1 and therefore were never 
analyzed in DO-312. Some examples of operational hazards that fit the narrow definition in DO-
312 but were never analyzed include: 
 an ITP is executed before ATC approves or denies the request 
 an ITP is denied by ATC, but is executed by Flight Crew (FC) 
 an ITP is not re-evaluated by FC before being executed 
 an ITP clearance is accepted but not executed 
 ITP criteria are incorrectly evaluated 
Table 2: Conditions Used to Describe Operational Hazards 
 A B C
1ATCevaluationofITP Approved Denied Noresponse
2FCreevaluationofITP Accepted Rejected Notreevaluated
3ComplianceofITPclearance Compliant Noncompliant Notrequested
4ITPmaneuverexecution Executed
correctly
Executed
incorrectly Notexecuted
5ITPmaneuveroutcome Maneuver
completed
Maneuver
abandoned
Maneuvernot
initiated
 
     
In the analysis of each of the ITP hazards in DO-312, additional assumptions are made that 
further narrow the scope of each operational hazard. For example, OH-1 describes an 
interruption of an ITP maneuver but the analysis of OH-1 also assumes that {(ATC evaluation = 
approved), (FC reevaluation=accepted) , (ITP clearance=compliant)} whenever an ITP maneuver 
                                                 
6Theseconditionsappeartocorrespondtothe“boundaryofapplication”inDO312.
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is interrupted.7  These assumptions overlook important scenarios, such as cases where the ITP 
maneuver is abandoned because it is discovered that ITP criteria are not met. In some cases, the 
analysis even overlooks the abnormal events that were used to derive the hazard in the first 
place. For example, OH-1 was identified in part by the possibility of an ACAS (TCAS) 
resolution advisory (RA) causing the crew to interrupt the maneuver. However, the analysis of 
OH-1 and the resulting fault tree completely omit that scenario.8  
     Even using the DO-312 definition of an operational hazard, the method for identifying 
hazards is inadequate because it is considers only known failure modes. Accidents often arise 
due to unanticipated failures or through normal interactions without any failures. Starting a 
safety analysis with failures puts the analyst at risk of identifying a very limited set of the 
potential causes, as opposed to beginning with hazards and identifying the actions and 
interactions that could potentially lead to hazardous states. Furthermore, it is difficult or 
impossible to verify the quantitative probabilities of failure prescribed in the fault tree nodes of 
DO-312. Hardware that has rich heritage can be verified probabilistically, but human operator or 
software performance cannot be predicted in this way.  

2.3.3   Barriers and Event Trees 
The approach used in DO-312 is grounded in identifying the effects of all the Operational 
Hazards and then designing barriers to prevent any adverse effects. Event trees were used to 
identify the different possible chains of events that can result from each hazard given the barriers 
in place and to quantify the probabilities of each adverse outcome. Both the barriers and effects 
were identified through a workshop process of expert interviews. The use of barriers (and indeed 
event trees themselves) comes from process safety and, in particular, the nuclear power industry. 
Aviation more commonly uses a fail-safe approach. 
     The barrier and event tree approach assumes that accidents are a result of linear (or multi-
linear) chains-of-events and that accidents can be eliminated by building barriers or “breaking 
the chain.” This approach is inadequate because it does not account for the nonlinear behavior 
exhibited in tightly coupled, complex systems. It also requires either oversimplified and 
subjective selection of potential event chains or a list that becomes unwieldy and cumbersome to 
analyze.9 To illustrate, one event tree includes the following chain of events: 
1) An ITP maneuver is interrupted 
2) Another aircraft is less than 10NM away, then less than 5NM away, then less than 
1NM away 
3) The flight crew visually sees the nearby10 aircraft and takes appropriate action. 
     The analysis recognizes that each event may or may not follow from the previous event, but 
assumes that if all events occur then a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) will NOT occur. In 
                                                 
7FromDO312descriptionofOH1:AnITPAircrarequestsandisclearedtoperformanITPoperaon.The
requestandclearancearecompliantwiththeprocedureandallcriteriaforITParemet.
8Infact,thefaulttreeanalysisofOH1onlyidentifiestwobasiccausesforOH1:atechnicalfailure(e.g.engine
failure)oramisuseoftrafficinformationbytheflightcrew.
9Eventtreeswerecreatedtomodeltheverysimpledesignsofnuclearplantshutdownsystemsandarerarely
usedoutsidethatapplication.Identifyingallpotentialorderingsofeventsispossibleonlyinverysimpledesigns
andsystems.
10“Nearby”meanslessthan1NM.
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addition to assuming that the probability of each event is known, this oversimplification ignores 
critical characteristics described above. For example, the conditions that led to the ITP 
interruption are ignored even though they may have a significant effect on whether the crew is 
able to visually notice a nearby aircraft. It also ignores critical situations including the possibility 
of a NMAC despite the crew eventually seeing the other aircraft and taking appropriate action. 
     The use of event trees also requires assigning probabilistic values to the mitigating effects of 
the barriers. For example, the aircraft crew detecting an aircraft’s proximity during an interrupted 
ITP maneuver through visual means and taking appropriate action to avoid an NMAC is assigned 
a probability of success of 0.80, and by means other than unaided visual acquisition and 
responding properly is assigned the probability of success of 0.90. These numbers seem arbitrary 
and difficult to support. 

2.3.4   Safety Targets 
Safety targets are assigned to events based on severity of the hazard. The Safety Objective for 
each hazard is an upward bound on the allowable probability of occurrence, where the 
probabilities of the Basic Causes are modeled, assumed, or required such that the likelihood of 
the associated hazard is less than the Safety Objective [10]. 
     This approach to safety assurance is inappropriate for several reasons. First, not all unsafe 
states are included in the safety target and many of the probabilities for events seem arbitrarily 
assigned. Second, the collision risk model used in the report calculates probabilities based on 
nominal system behavior, where the probability of longitudinal overlap—a potential crash 
scenario—is the aggregation of errors in aircraft attitude and environmental assumptions. The 
underlying mathematics is executed flawlessly, but the problem lies in the modeling 
assumptions, i.e., that ITP and Reference aircraft will always maintain minimum separation 
requirements and that error propagation is due solely to instrumentation error. The “Collision 
Risk Model” would perhaps be more aptly named “Collision Risk Model for the Expected
System State”. Accidents rarely happen during expected operations, however: Virtually all occur 
during off-nominal system behavior. 
     Finally, the process presented in DO-312 to define event probabilities assumes that all the 
failure modes are independent. This assumption contradicts the conclusions of many accident 
investigation reports: it is rarely one basic event that leads to an accident, but multiple events that 
share common roots [11]. A typical example is that budget restrictions stemming from an 
increasingly competitive environment takes its toll on maintenance expenditures as well as 
operators’ ability to respond to adverse events, such as increased work hours causing more  
fatigue and degraded operational performance leading to reduced procedure conformity. 

2.3.5   Human Error Analysis 
The human-oriented error analyses in DO-312 are based on operational safety workshops with 
pilots, controllers and operations experts as conducted by EUROCONTROL. A linear chain of 
human actions is assumed that leads towards a Basic Cause. Then the experts qualitatively 
assessed the likelihood of occurrence for certain types of errors as very often, often, rare, or very 
rare. These qualitative measures were mapped to quantitative measures and assessed relative to 
classifications in EUROCONTROL’s ATM standard [12]. 
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     The quantitative values used to represent qualitative opinions appear to be arbitrary: An error 
that may happen “Very Often” is assigned the probability of occurring between 1-10%, while a 
“Very Rare” is described as occurring less than 0.01% of the time. For example, “The probability 
that the ITP Aircraft flight crew levels off at an intermediate Flight Level is assumed to occur no 
more than Very Rare” [4], meaning that this scenario has a probability of occurrence less than 
1E-04. 
     Human errors are identified in DO-312 by constructing a top-down fault tree beginning with 
each identified hazard and drilling down to identify potential causes. When an identified cause 
describes a single failure, a human error, or an environmental factor, that event is considered a 
Basic Cause and the analysis of the branch stops. As noted above, the hazard identification 
process is inconsistent and incomplete, which results in fault trees that identify and evaluate an 
incomplete set of human errors. 
     The problems are not just in completeness. Human error is treated in exactly the same way as 
a physical failure, that is, as a deviation from a predefined behavior or procedure. Unfortunately, 
this treatment of human error oversimplifies it as a binary decision between right and wrong. 
Many of the most important situations involved in accidents are overlooked because they are 
difficult or impossible to model in this way, including: 
 Situations where the correct behavior is not predefined or not clear 
 Situations where the prescribed behavior is thought to be incorrect by the person 
responsible for following it 
 Situations where procedures conflict with each other, or it is not clear which procedure 
applies 
 Situations where the person has multiple responsibilities or goals that may conflict 
 Situations where the information necessary to carry out a procedure is not available or is 
incorrect 
 Situations where past experiences and current knowledge conflict with a procedure 
 Situations where the procedure is misunderstood or the responsibility for the procedure is 
unclear 
 Situations where the procedure is incorrect 
     For example, the identification of hazards anticipated the basic cause “FC fails to accomplish 
reassessment” [of the satisfaction of the ITP criteria, which is required]. However, this human 
error appears to have been overlooked throughout the analysis of every hazard, including OH-2. 
     The analysis produced a short list of human errors such as “flight crew fails to detect 
inadequate climb/descent rate”. Because basic causes are the “lowest level of failure,” human 
errors are not analyzed in further detail. No attempt is made to understand why the human errors 
may arise or to prevent them. Instead, all errors are assumed to occur randomly at a given 
probability rate. If necessary, mitigation attempts are made to reduce the chance that human 
errors will lead to a hazard. Mitigation is done by adding barriers called “mitigation measures”. 
Interestingly, every mitigation measure is simply a new procedure that is imposed on the 
humans. 
     Perhaps because human behavior was treated as random, no attempt was made to explain or 
understand the potential human errors. The lack of such understanding precludes the possibility 
of eliminating or reducing errors in the first place, which is typically more effective than 
managing hazards through mitigation alone. There is also no guarantee that humans will perform 
better when additional [mitigation] procedures are added, and they may actually perform worse 
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because of the additional workload. Instead, a safety analysis should not only identify what 
humans can do wrong, but also why and how it can be avoided. Assuming that the flight crew 
and ATCO are not intentionally malicious, this identification requires understanding the 
conditions under which each erroneous decision can make sense to them and modifying or 
adding requirements to help make the correct decisions obvious. 
     To summarize, the treatment of human actions as independent random events greatly 
oversimplifies the role of humans and may lead to incorrect conclusions. Human behavior is 
usually not random, but influenced by the current context, the information observed, and  
constructed beliefs about the system. Human behavior is also heavily dependent on interactions 
with other system components and past experiences and is rarely independent of other events. 
2.3.6   Summary of Critique 
Even if DO-312 safety analysis for ATSA-ITP had been done correctly and completely 
according to their own methodology, the basic approach used assumes that accidents are caused 
by a linear chain of events and that the probability of links on the chain contributing to a 
hazardous scenario can be accurately modeled. Although many electro-mechanical parts have 
sufficient heritage to yield an accurate probabilistic assessment, such individual physical 
component statistics may not hold in a complex system and is not useful for new components or 
old components operating in new environments. Even less can be said with numerical precision 
about how other types of system components, such as humans, software, or some combination 
thereof, will behave in a nonlinear and dynamic socio-technical system. Although the analysis 
laid out in DO-312 may be adequate for some specific components of the system, a 
comprehensive safety assessment of a complete system requires a different approach. 
3 Using STAMP and STPA for NextGen  
The significant technical changes envisioned for NextGen creates a necessity for a new, more 
powerful model of accident causality that better represents today’s complex, socio-technical 
systems. The new model used in our analysis, called STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident 
Model and Processes) [6][13], extends the types of accidents and causes that can be considered 
by including non-linear, indirect, and feedback relationships among events. In this way, the 
traditional causality model is extended to consider new types of accident causality brought about 
by component interactions (rather than just component failures), cognitively complex human 
mistakes, management and organizational errors, software errors (particularly requirements 
errors), etc. Accidents or unacceptable losses can result not only from system component failures 
but also from interactions among system components—both physical and social—that violate 
system safety constraints. STPA (System Theoretic Process Analysis) is a hazard analysis 
technique built on STAMP. 
     In systems theory, emergent properties associated with a set of components are related to 
constraints upon the degree of freedom of those components’ behavior. System safety, then, can 
be reformulated as a system control problem rather than a component reliability problem: 
accidents or losses occur when component failures, external disturbances, and/or dysfunctional 
interactions among system components are not handled adequately or controlled—where 
controls may be managerial, organizational, physical, operational, or manufacturing—such that 
required safety constraints on behavior are violated.   
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     In a systems-theoretic view of safety, the emergent safety properties are controlled or 
enforced by a set of safety constraints related to the behavior of the system components. Safety 
constraints specify those relationships among system variables or components that constitute the 
non-hazardous or safe system states—for example, the power must never be on when the access 
door to the high-power source is open; two aircraft must never violate minimum separation 
requirements; pilots in a combat zone must be able to identify targets as hostile or friendly; and 
the public health system must prevent the exposure of the public to contaminated water and food 
products. Accidents result from interactions among system components that violate these 
constraints—in other words, from a lack of appropriate constraints on component and system 
behavior.  
     Section 3.1 describes the hazard analysis procedure, called STPA, used to identify the system 
constraints necessary to ensure safe development and operation of complex socio-technical 
systems. It also presents a model-based framework, called Intent Specifications, which captures 
the results of the hazard analysis in a readable, reviewable way by people from multiple 
disciplines.11 

3.1    STPA (System Theoretic Process Analysis) 
In STAMP, accidents are viewed as resulting from inadequate enforcement of constraints on 
system behavior. Figure 6 shows a generic (example) safety control structure to enforce safety 
constraints. Each hierarchical level of the control structure represents a control process and 
control loop with actions and feedback. Two control structures are shown in Figure 6—system 
development and system operations—both of which have different responsibilities with respect 
to enforcing safe system behavior. The reason behind the inadequate enforcement may involve 
classic component failures, but it may also result from unsafe interactions among components 
operating as designed or from erroneous control actions by software or humans. 
                                                 
11Themodelbasedspecificationmethod,IntentSpecifications,waspartiallydevelopedforthecertificationof
TCASIIandlaterextended.
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Figure 6:  Example Model of a Socio-Technical Safety Control Structure 

     Human and automated controllers use a process model (usually called a mental model for 
humans), which they use to determine what control actions are needed. The process model 
contains the controller’s understanding of  (1) the current state of the controlled process, (2) the 
desired state of the controlled process, and (3) the ways the process can change state. Software 
and human errors often result from incorrect process models, e.g., the software thinks the 
spacecraft has landed and shuts off the descent engines. Accidents can therefore occur when an 
incorrect or incomplete process model causes a controller to provide control actions that are 
hazardous.  While process model flaws are not the only causes of accidents involving software 
and human errors, it is a major contributor. 
     There are four types of hazardous control actions that need to be eliminated or controlled to 
prevent accidents: 
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1) A control action required for safety is not provided or is not followed 
2) An unsafe control action is provided that leads to a hazard 
3) A potentially safe control action is provided too late, too early, or out of sequence 
4) A safe control action is stopped too soon or applied too long. 

     STPA (System Theoretic Process Analysis) is a hazard analysis technique built on STAMP. 
Identifying the potentially unsafe control actions for the specific system being considered is the 
first step in STPA. These unsafe control actions are used to create safety requirements and 
constraints on the behavior of both the system and its components. Additional analysis can then 
be performed to identify the detailed scenarios leading to the violation of the safety constraints. 
As in any hazard analysis, these scenarios are then used to design controls or mitigate mitigation 
measures for the potential hazards in the system design. 
     Before beginning an STPA hazard analysis, potential accidents and related system-level 
hazards are identified along with the corresponding system safety constraints that must be 
controlled. As an illustrative example for this application, consider a flight crew in oceanic 
airspace. The fundamental losses or accidents under consideration are human death or injury. 
The system-level hazards relevant to this definition of an accident include:  
 H-1: A pair of controlled aircraft violate minimum separation standards 
 H-2: Aircraft enters unsafe atmospheric region 
 H-3: Aircraft enters uncontrolled state 
 H-4: Aircraft enters unsafe attitude (excessive turbulence or pitch/roll/yaw that causes 
passenger injury but not necessarily aircraft loss)  
 H-5: Aircraft enters a prohibited area 
     For the application used in this report, we focused on hazard H-1. 
     STPA is performed on a functional control diagram of the system, which is shown in Figure 7 
for the ITP-related parts of the system. The first part of STPA identifies hazardous control 
actions for each component that could produce a system-level hazard by violating the system 
safety constraints. Once the set of hazardous control actions has been identified, the second part 
of STPA analyzes the system to determine the potential scenarios that could lead to providing a 
hazardous control action. These scenarios can be used to design controls for the hazards or, if the 
design already exists, to ensure that these scenarios are adequately controlled.  
STPA Step One: The first step of STPA identifies control actions for each component that can 
lead to one or more of the defined system hazards. The four general types of unsafe control 
actions were shown above. Hazardous control actions can be documented using a table as in 
Table 3. The hazardous control actions can then be translated into system and component safety 
requirements and constraints.   
     Each item in the table should be evaluated to determine whether it is hazardous as defined by 
the system-level hazards. For instance, in this example the flight crew not executing ITP is not 
hazardous because it does not lead to H-6 specified above. If this situation is a safety concern, 
then the hazard list can be updated to include the corresponding hazard. On the other hand, 
executing the procedure when the criteria are not satisfied could clearly lead to a loss of 
separation. Each unsafe control action is then translated into a component-level safety constraint 
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(e.g. ITP must not be executed unless it is approved, FC must follow regional procedures when 
aborting the ITA, etc.).  

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Figure 7:  Safety Control Structure for ATSA-ITP 
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Table 3:  Potentially Hazardous Control Actions for Flight Crew (Hazard H-6) 
Control 
Action 
Required Safe 
Action Not 
Provided 
Unsafe Action is 
Provided 
Incorrect 
Timing/Order 
Stopped 
Too Soon 
Flight 
Crew 
executes 
ITP 
 
ITP executed when not 
approved. 
ITP executed when ITP 
criteria are not satisfied. 
 
ITP executed with 
incorrect climb rate, 
final altitude, etc. 
ITP executed too 
soon before 
approval. 
 
ITP executed too 
late. 
 
Flight 
Crew 
performs 
abnormal 
termination 
of ITP 
FC continues with 
maneuver in 
dangerous 
situation. 
FC aborts unnecessarily.
 
FC does not follow 
regional procedures 
while aborting. 
   
 
STPA Step Two: The second step of STPA examines each control loop in the safety control 
structure to identify potential causal factors for each hazardous control action, i.e., the scenarios 
for causing a hazard. 8 shows a generic control loop that can be used to guide this step. While 
STPA Step One focused on the provided control actions (the upper left corner of 8), STPA Step 
Two expands the analysis to consider causal factors along the rest of the control loop. 
     For example, a safety constraint might be violated because the process model of the controller 
is incorrect, for example, the FC thinks it is safe to execute the ITP when it is not (an incorrect 
process model). The incorrect process model, in turn, may be the result of inadequate feedback 
provided by a failed sensor or the feedback may be delayed or corrupted.  Alternatively, the 
designers may have omitted a feedback signal or the FC may have received incorrect from ATC 
or from other input devices (such as ADS-B). 
     Once the second step of STPA has been applied to determine potential causes for each 
hazardous control action identified in STPA Step One, the causes should be eliminated or 
controlled in the design. More information about STPA can be found in other publications [6]. 
Our safety analysis (limited by time and resources) is shown in Appendix B. 
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Figure 8:  General Control Loop with Causal Factors 
 
3.2   Intent Specifications 
An intent specification is a specification and model-based development framework supporting 
system design and other system engineering activities, intended to assist humans at all 
organizational levels in dealing with complexity by providing more readable and reviewable 
specifications.  Intent specifications are based on psychological research in human problem 
solving and on basic principles of system theory and system engineering [6].    
     Intent specifications do not contain additional information that is not typically found in 
detailed system engineering specifications. However, an intent specification differs from a 
standard system engineering specification primarily in its structure, which is designed to (1) 
facilitate the tracing of system-level requirements and design constraints down into detailed 
design and implementation and the documentation of design rationale, (2) assist in the assurance 
of various system properties (such as safety) in the initial design and implementation, and (3) 
reduce the costs of implementing changes and re-analysis when the system is changed, as it 
inevitably will be.
   
 25
 
Figure 9:  Intent Specification Hierarchy  
      
     There are seven levels in an intent specification, as shown in Figure 9.  Levels do not 
represent refinement, as in other commonly used hierarchical specification frameworks.  Instead, 
each level of an intent specification represents a completely different model of the same system 
and supports a different type of reasoning about it:  each model or level presents a complete view 
of the system from a different perspective.  The model at each level is described in terms of a 
different set of attributes or language.  Refinement and decomposition occurs within each level 
of the specification. In addition to intra-level refinement, the levels are organized in a 
“Means/Ends” hierarchy. In such a hierarchy, the information at a level acts as the goals (the 
ends) with respect to the model at the next lower level [1]. In other words, the next lower level is 
where the means to the ends of the current level are implemented. 
     Although this report focuses primarily on Levels 1, 2, and 3, the following bullets briefly 
describe the content and objectives of each level: 
 The top level (Level 0) provides a project management view and insight into the 
relationship between the plans and project development, with project management plans, 
safety plan, status information, and other management tools.  
 Level 1 of an intent specification is the customer view and assists system engineers and 
customers in agreeing on what should be built and whether that has been accomplished.  
It includes system goals, requirements, design constraints, hazards, environmental 
assumptions, and system limitations.  
 Level 2, System Design, is the system engineering level and provides the structure and 
content needed for engineers to reason about the system in terms of the physical 
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principles and laws upon which the system design is based. It documents the basic 
system-level design decisions made to satisfy the requirements and constraints at level 1.  
 The third level, or Blackbox Behavior level, enhances reasoning about the logical design 
of the system as a whole and the interaction among the components as well as the 
functional state without distractions from implementation issues.  This level acts as an 
unambiguous interface between system engineering and component engineering to assist 
in communication and review of component blackbox behavioral requirements and to 
reason about the combined behavior of individual components using informal review, 
formal analysis, and simulation.  The models at this level are formal (rigorously defined) 
and can be both executed and subjected to formal analysis. These formal models can play 
an important role in validation by being executed in system simulation environments to 
identify requirements and design errors (for example, completeness and consistency 
analyses). The language at this level was created originally to specify TCAS II for the 
FAA/RTCA [2].  
 The next two levels (4 and 5) provide the information necessary to reason about 
individual component design and implementation issues.  Levels 4 and 5 represent the 
standard component documentation used on most any engineering project. 
 Finally, the sixth level provides a view of the operational system.  The effort in this task 
has predominantly focused on levels 0-3 of the intent specification.   
     Figure 10 shows an example of intent specification traceability between Levels 1 and 2 
through partial specification of the ITP Equipment example used for this research. Traceability is 
captured through hyperlinks denoted by arrows and the specification item tag (for example, H-
1). Traceability links denote different relationships between specifications based on their 
direction. An up arrow () denotes that the current specification item is involved in the 
implementation of the intent of a specification item at a higher level in the “means-ends” 
hierarchy denoted by the tag after the arrow. A down arrow () points to a specification item at a 
lower level in the “means-ends” hierarchy that is involved in the implementation of the intent of 
the current specification item. Left and right arrows denote relationships between specification 
items at the same level in the “means-ends” hierarchy that affect the items’ relationships to items 
on other levels. The direction of the arrow for this type of relationship depends on the physical 
location of the specification item in the intent specification document. A left arrow () points to 
a specification item at the same level that appears earlier in the specification than the current 
specification item. Conversely, a right arrow () points to another specification item at the same 
level that appears later in the current specification document. Thus, in Figure 10, the hazard H1 
is linked to the accident related to this hazard (e.g. ACC1). This relationship shows ‘why’ the 
hazard is of concern:. The accident has a link to H1 showing the related hazard(s). Similarly, H1 
points across the level to a safety constraint [1.2] derived from the hazard. The safety constraint 
has downward pointing links to Level 2 where that safety constraint is enforced with system 
design decisions. Lastly, the relationship between the design decisions is captured through traces 
across Level 2. 
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Level 1 
Hazard 
[H-1] A pair of controlled aircraft violate minimum separation standards ([A-1],[1.2]) 
Causal Analysis 
[FC.1] FC believes aircraft climb/descent capability is greater than it is (process model 
inconsistency) 
[FC.2] FC does not receive communication from ATC (inadequate/missing feedback) 
Safety Requirements 
[1.2] ITP shall provide the flight crews of aircraft operating in procedural airspace the ability to 
determine if an ITP maneuver is appropriate ([H-1], [FC.1], [2.1]) 
[1.3.1] ITP training shall include communication protocols (both channels and appropriate 
syntax) between flight crew and air traffic control ([H-1], [FC.2], [2.5]) 
… 
Level 2  
Design Decisions 
[2.1] The ITP flight crew must check that the following criteria are fulfilled before requesting an 
ITP clearance. This requirement does not imply that an individual assessment of each criterion is 
carried out by the flight crew, but rather that each criterion is assessed by either the flight crew, 
or by automation (see section 3.5.1). Although not required for all criterion, it is recognized that 
automation may provide a more predictable solution. ([1.2], [1.9],[1.26],[1.27]) 
[2.1.1] The Ownship climb/descend capability criteria are considered passed if and only if the 
ITP Aircraft can climb/descend in the desired direction at a rate of 300 fpm or more.  
      Design Rational: Initiation Distance Criteria and other geometric values ([2.1.2], [2.1.3], 
[2.1.4]) were selected such that when a Flight Level change at 300 fpm is performed with the 
related 20 or 30 kts Closing Ground Speed Differential, the distance between the aircraft 
does not become less than the ITP Separation Minimum (i.e., 10 NM). 
[2.5] ATC should include a minimum data set in its clearance, in order to minimize the risk of 
confusion during communication between the Flight Crew and ATC. This information includes 
the Reference Aircraft ID and the cleared-to Flight Level in the ITP clearance.([1.3.1]) 
Figure 10:  ITP Equipment Intent Specification Partial Example 
     Intent information represents the design rationale upon which the specification is based.  This 
design rationale is integrated directly into the specification. For example, “Design Decision.1” in 
10, and its related Design Decisions in Level 2, represents a design implementation with the 
intent of preventing “Hazard H-1” and in turn enforcing “Safety Requirement Constraint.1.2”. 
Each level also contains additional information (such as that labeled “Design Rational” in 
 28
Figure 10) about underlying assumptions upon which the requirements, design, and safety 
assessment is based.   
     Assumptions must also be documented and are especially important in operational safety 
analyses.  When conditions change such that the assumptions are no longer true, then a new 
safety analysis should be triggered.  In the traditional system engineering specification approach, 
these assumptions may be included in a safety analysis document (or at least should be), but are 
not usually traced to the parts of the implementation they affect.  Therefore, even if the system 
safety engineer knows that a safety analysis assumption has been changed, it is very difficult and 
resource-intensive process to figure out which parts of the design used that assumption. 
Appendix B shows the intent specification we generated for ATSA-ITP. Because of 
limitations on time and resources available to us, the specification is necessarily incomplete but 
provides a good example of the results of using STAMP/STPA. 
     In summary, intent specifications foster a transition from system to component (including 
software) specifications and the integration of formal and informal aspects of system and 
software development.  The structure facilitates the tracing of system-level requirements and 
constraints into the design and the assurance of various system properties (such as safety) in the 
initial design and implementation. It also reduces the costs of implementing changes and re-
analysis by providing traceability and rationale capture. Finally, each level of the intent 
specification supports a different type of reasoning about the system, from high-level systems 
engineers working with system-level goals and tradeoffs to the experts who design and 
implement individual components. 
4 Comparison of the Two Approaches and Their Results 
The results of any derivation and of a specification is inextricably linked with the overall 
philosophy and viewpoint of the approach, the models used to understand system behavior, and 
the definitions that undergird the models. Therefore, in order to compare the results of DO-312 
with those of STPA, we must also compare the underlying philosophy of each approach, as well 
as the definitions and terms used in each analysis. Sections 2 and 2 describe each approach in 
greater detail, but some of these accounts are reiterated here for succinct comparison. Table 4 
summarizes the comparison. 
Table 4:  General Comparison of Approaches 
 DO-312 STAMP/STPA 
Analysis 
Philosophy 
Success oriented, i.e. it assumes 
nominal case then tries to predict 
probability of deviation 
Provides set of contingencies for 
off-nominal behavior 
Assumes worst-case scenario, i.e. it 
starts with accident, then hazards, 
then causal factors and assumes that 
any of the causal factors can happen 
Emphasis on preventing or reducing 
failures 
Emphasis on enforcing constraints 
on system (and thus component) 
behavior 
Assumes most failure modes are 
independent 
Accounts for sub-system 
interactions and how these influence 
safety-related behavior 
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Causal Factors Considers only hardware failures, or 
treats operators and software as if 
they are hardware (e.g. leaves on a 
fault tree with assigned probabilities 
of failure) 
Assumes that software does not 
“fail” but can still be hazardous due 
to flawed requirements or unsafe 
interactions with rest of system  
Human operators perform within the 
context of a larger system design 
and, like software, do not 
necessarily “fail” but can make 
unsafe decisions 
Certification 
Method 
Assign performance goals or 
necessary probabilities of failure, 
then manufacturer attempts to 
assure compliance 
Specify safety constraints derived 
from STPA, based on safety-related 
control actions and required 
component behavior which 
manufacturer implements. 

DO-312 and STPA are fundamentally different in their approach to identifying accident 
causality. DO-312 is based on the assumption that the system operates nominally and that 
accidents result due to deviation from nominal behavior at the component or sub-system level. 
Safe behavior is then imposed by providing contingencies for the identified off-nominal 
behaviors or conditions. In contrast, STAMP/STPA assumes a worst-case scenario and identifies 
potential scenarios that could lead to that worst case. 
     As described earlier, the DO-312 safety analysis is based on a chain-of-events model of 
causality, where the events represent component failures. Therefore DO-312 relies on preventing 
or reducing the probability of component failure to prevent accidents. Fault tree analysis (FTA) 
(at least as used in DO-312) also assumes that most of the component failure modes are 
independent. In addition, FTA treats human operators and software as if they fail like mechanical 
hardware, and then assigns probabilities of failure to these components.  
     Alternatively, STPA and STAMP assume the worst case in identifying accident causality. 
That is, STPA starts with an accident, identifies hazards that may lead to an accident, and then 
identifies causal factors. An important distinction with STPA and the FTA performed in DO-312 
is the assumption about basic causal factors. DO-312 assumes or prescribes independent 
probabilities for off-nominal behavior, while STPA assumes that any and all causal factors may 
occur coincidentally. While the nodes of a fault tree assume independence of causes, STPA 
accounts for sub-system interaction using control systems theory and in fact assumes that not 
only can causal factors be dependent but also that the behavior of one component might be 
highly influential on other aspects of the system.  
     STPA also recognizes that software does not fail, but merely performs the way it was 
designed—it can therefore be hazardous due to flawed requirements (or implementation) or 
unsafe interactions with the rest of the system. Nor do human operators fail in the sense that 
hardware does nor do they fail randomly (except, perhaps, in the case of a “slip” although that 
can also be influenced by the design of the control panel). Instead, they are influenced by the 
design and operation of the overall context of the system and can thus make unsafe decisions due 
to the factors in Figure 12, such as incorrect mental models of the process they are controlling, 
possibly due to missing or incorrect feedback.  Finally, STPA emphasizes the enforcement of 
constraints on component behavior (including software and human operators), which then affects 
the emergent system behavior.  
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     Due to the differences outlined above, the certification method that results is necessarily 
dissimilar. The DO-312 is performance based; the document specifies performance goals or 
necessary minimum probabilities of component and system failure in order to meet the 
assumptions used in the fault or event trees. Manufacturers must then attempt to assure 
compliance with these performance metrics. On the other hand, the analysis produced by STPA 
results in a specification of behavioral constraints (requirements), based on safety-related control 
actions for all the system components. 
 
4.1   Hazard Definitions and Identification 
DO-312 and STPA use vastly different definitions of the term “hazard,” shown in Table 5, where 
the DO-312 definition is unconventional. The difference between the definitions renders the task 
of comparing the ensuing results quite difficult. Consider the hazards identified in the second 
row of Table 5. There are two general problems with the identified hazards, also discussed 
earlier: (1) many of the hazards are actually events or causes, and (2) several of the hazards are 
not actually hazards (and in the case of OH_5, the operational hazard is actually the very 
behavior required to ensure safety). However, most of the analysis in DO-312 pertains only to 
OH_2 and OH_6, which are singled out as the only hazards that relate to safety.12 OH_1, 
interruption of an ITP maneuver (which is actually a cause that could lead to a hazard), was 
deemed to have less significant impact on safety, but again this distinction reflects the 
overarching philosophy of assuming nominal- or best-case behavior. Using STPA, we actually 
identified interruption of maneuver in later steps as an important potential cause of a hazard and 
derived requirements to constrain this behavior. 
     The list for STPA includes general hazards for aircraft safety, which have been used for 
hazard analysis and equipment specifications for other aspects of the airspace domain [15]. For 
further refinement of scope and to consider only those aspects that directly relate to ITP, the 
STPA analysis focused on preventing a violation of minimum separation requirements, hazard 
H-1. 

Table 5:  Hazard Analysis Comparison 
 DO-312 STPA
Hazard Definition An event that may arise when the 
system is in a faulted mode; events 
leading to an OH are called its Basic 
Causes and Abnormal Events, and 
can either be system failures, human 
errors, procedures dysfunctions or 
failures and conditions external to 
the application itself 
Or, any condition, event, or 
circumstance which could induce an 
A system state or set of conditions 
that together with a particular set of 
worst-case environmental 
conditions, will lead to an accident 
(loss) 
                                                 
12Again,wearguethattheseshouldnotbecalledhazardsiftheydonotimpactsafety.
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operational effect 
Hazard 
Identification 
OH_1 – Interruption of an ITP 
maneuver (flight crew abandons the 
maneuver).  
OH_2 – Execution of an ITP 
clearance not compliant with ITP 
Criteria. 
OH_3 – ITP request not accepted by 
ATC.  
OH_4 – Rejection by the flight crew 
of an ITP clearance not compliant 
with the ITP Criteria. 
OH_5 – Rejection by the flight crew 
of an ITP clearance compliant with 
the ITP Criteria. 
OH_6 – Incorrect execution of an 
ITP maneuver. 
H1 – a pair of controlled aircraft 
violate minimum separation 
standards 
H2 – aircraft enters unsafe 
atmospheric region 
H3 – aircraft enters uncontrolled 
state 
H4 – aircraft enters unsafe attitude 
(excessive turbulence or 
pitch/roll/yaw that causes passenger 
injury but not necessarily aircraft 
loss)  
H5 – aircraft enters a prohibited 
area 
 
4.2   Analysis Process and Results 
Chapter 2 and the earlier sections of this chapter describe the differences in the methods used in 
DO-312 and STPA. This section is intended to further demonstrate those differences by showing 
a few short examples of results. The example used is instructive because it consists of a cause 
identified in both the DO-312 and STPA analyses, i.e., execution of a procedure not compliant 
with ITP criteria. Specifically, the cause in DO-312 is defined as noncompliance with ITP 
distance and undetected by both the flight crew and air traffic control. A similar type of analysis 
can be performed for all of the other ITP criteria (mach, closing speed, and others) and our STPA 
has purposefully used a more general unsafe control action, i.e., execution of ITP when criteria 
(any of the flight parameters) are not met. 
4.2.1   DO-312 Approach 
Beginning with the Operational Hazards defined above, DO-312 identifies causal factors by 
using fault trees. As an example, see Figure 11. The top of the fault tree, “Procedure not 
compliant with criterion 2…” represents a high level cause of a hazard: improper execution of 
ITP. According to this analysis, failure to comply can occur either because the FC does not 
understand the minimum distance or the ATC does not receive data or fails to detect 
noncompliance (which could also be due to an error in the communication protocol).  
 32
     Notice first the assigned safety objective at the top of the tree, which fits into a larger system-
level safety objective. The lower level causes and associated probabilities are combined, 
depending on their logical and/or relationships, to yield a higher level probability of occurrence. 
Two nodes of the fault tree in Figure 11 represent human behavior (a critique of this approach 
was provided earlier). The probability of a human error cannot be verified, and the fault tree 
analysis gives no guidance on how to prevent these errors but instead assumes they happen 
arbitrarily or randomly. The fault tree also assumes independent behavior, however the 
interaction and behavior of the flight crew and ATC may be coupled, with the parties exerting 
influence on each other or being influenced by higher-level system constraints. Finally, the 
analysis asserts that communication errors are due to corruption of data during transport 
(essentially a hardware or software error), but there are many other reasons for potential errors in 
communication. 
 
Figure 11:  Example Fault Tree from DO-312 [4] 
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4.2.2   STPA Approach 
Figure 12 shows the results of STPA and the various causes identified using controls and 
systems theory. The STPA example includes the basic communication errors included in FTA, 
but it also includes additional reasons for communication errors as well as guidance for 
understanding human error within the context of the system. Communication errors may result 
because there is confusion about multiple sources of information (for either the flight crew or 
ATC), confusion about heritage or newly implemented communication protocols, or simple 
transcription or speaking errors. There is no way to quantify or verify the probabilities of any of 
these sources of error for many reasons, particularly because the errors are dependent on context 
and the operator environments are highly dynamic. Instead of assuming that humans will rarely 
“fail,” our analysis assumes they will make mistakes and specifies requirements accordingly. 

 
Figure 12:  Example STPA Results 
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4.2.3   Specifications and Summary of Results 
Each analysis results in a specification: either assumptions about the system (DO-312) or 
requirements on system components or operators (STPA).13 The approach to human and 
software behavior in DO-312 leads to assumptions about their performance, while STPA results 
in requirements that constrain or enforce certain types of behavior. Table 6 shows this difference 
and maps the analyses shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12. While DO-312 assumes or requires 
that a communication error (due only to corruption of data) occurs no more than “often,” STPA 
specifies requirements to ensure that communication is done correctly and completely and also 
specifies ways to detect if communication has not been done correctly. Further refinement of the 
STPA requirements will result in specifications that relate to timing or obsolescence of data and 
accounts for the processes by which humans make decisions, instead of assuming that ATC error 
is Very Rare.14 Table 6 illustrates the difference in specifications, and how these differences 
necessarily arise from the differences in the philosophical approach to safety assurance; the 
techniques used to model system behavior; the more powerful treatment of system complexity, 
human performance, software behavior included in STPA; and the definitions used within these 
techniques. 
Table 6: Comparison of Specifications 
 DO-312 STPA
Requirements and 
Assumptions 
Assumption 
AS.40 The probability that ATC 
does not receive ITP Distance (as 
part of the ITP climb/descent 
request) but approves ITP procedure 
or fails to detect that ITP Distance 
received in the request is not 
compliant, is assumed to occur no 
more frequently than Very Rare. 
AS.12 The corruption of 
information because of HF occurs 
no more than Often. 
 
Requirement 
[1.1.2] ITP shall provide the flight 
crews of aircraft operating in 
procedural airspace the ability to 
determine a clear procedure for 
communicating data about the 
desired flight level change and 
necessary state data to the local air 
traffic controller  
[1.2.1.1] Once ITP request has been 
made, all communication between 
ATC and the FC must occur on the 
same communication channel 
[1.2.1.2] All communication 
protocols must include definitions 
of when a communication is 
complete 
                                                 
13Bothapproachesultimatelyincludeassumptionsaboutbehaviororenvironment,justasbothapproacheslead
tospecificrequirementsaboutbehaviororperformance.Butthisexampleillustrateshowthedifferentapproaches
yieldtotallydivergentresults.
14See[4]orSection3hereinforafurtherdescriptionofwhattheseassumptionsmean.
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 DO-312 STPA
[1.10] – [1.17] (see appendix B) 
[1.18] ATC must have access to 
current* knowledge of the velocity, 
heading, and location of all aircraft 
involved in ITP request 
Assumption: ATC will have this 
knowledge as part of their overall 
ability to maintain separation, 
regardless of ITP clearances. 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
     In this report, we compared the safety assurance methodology being used on ATSA-ITP with 
a more general approach called STAMP/STPA. While the assurance methods used for ITP were 
based on older, chain-of-events models of accident causation, STPA is based on a systems-
theoretic model that captures additional accident causes associated with the complex socio-
technical systems of today. STPA is a more powerful hazard analysis technique that not only 
captures the failure modes identified in event or fault tree analyses but also captures errors due to 
interaction or inadequate specifications that are prevalent in complex systems.  
     The type of specification and certification of requirements for ATSA-ITP that arise using 
STAMP/STPA are much more in line with approaches used traditionally in aircraft system 
certification (for example, TCAS II [2]) than that being used for NextGen. 
     This report also illustrates the importance of the philosophical assumptions that undergird any 
approach to safety assurance as well as the definitions of the approach’s constituent parts. One 
approach is to assume likely or expected system behavior and predict accident causation based 
on nominal behavior or from deviations off of nominal. However, accidents do not, and should 
not, occur when a system is behaving normally, but rather accidents happen because of a 
confluence of events and causes that are often related. By trying to show how or why an accident 
can happen, an analysis can produce a more complete set of potential accident causes. 
Combining an approach that assumes worst-case system behavior with analytical techniques that 
capture component interaction and emergent system properties should produce a more 
comprehensive set of safety-related requirements that apply to the complex, dynamic nature of 
NextGen and future changes in the NAS. 
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Appendix A – Acronyms 
 
Intent Specification Terms: 
1 – 5:  Requirements Level 
G:       Goal (Level 1) 
EA:     Environmental Assumption (Level 1) 
EC:     Environmental Constraint (Level 1) 
OP:     Operator Behavior (Level 1) 
L:        Limitation (Level 1) 
C:        Non-safety related Design Constraint (Level 1) 
SC:      Safety-related Design Constraint (Level 1) 
Other Terms: 
ADS-B: Automatic Dependant Surveillance Broadcast 
ASTA:   Airborne Traffic Situational Awareness 
ATC:      Air Traffic Controller 
FC:         Flight Crew 
FL:         Flight Level 
ITP:        In Trail Procedure 
RA:        Reference Aircraft 
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Appendix B – Intent Specification 
 
B.1  Preface 
 
The ATSA-ITP requirements are specified as an intent specification in this document. Intent 
specifications were developed as a result of the efforts to certify TCAS-II [2]. It differs from a 
standard specification primarily in its structure: Hierarchical abstraction is based on intent 
(“why”) rather  than simply the more usual what and how. Because each level is mapped to the 
appropriate part of the intent levels above and below it, traceability of design rationale and 
design decisions is provided from high-level system requirements and constraints down to code 
(or physical form if the function is implemented in hardware) and vice versa. Only the first three 
levels of the intent specification are included here because the goal is to provide a requirements 
specification that can be used by the manufacturers of the ITP boxes.  
     There are five levels to an intent specification. Each level supports a different type of 
reasoning about the system and represents a different model of the same system. The model at 
each level is described in terms of a different set of attributes and perhaps language. 
     The highest level of an intent specification represents the “contract” between the customer 
and the system engineers and assists the system engineers in their reasoning about system-level 
properties such as system goals, requirements, constraints, priorities, and tradeoffs among them. 
The second level, System Design Principles, allows engineers to reason about the system in 
terms of the physical principles and laws upon which the design is based. The third, or 
Component Blackbox Behavior level, provides a formal, executable model of the system and 
enhances reasoni8ng about the logical design of the system as a whole and the interactions 
among the components as well as the functional state without being distracted by implementation 
issues. The lowest two levels provide the information necessary to reason about individual 
component design and implementation issues. The mappings between levels provide the 
relational information that allows reasoning across the hierarchical levels and tracing from high-
level requirements down to implementation and vice versa. 
      The intent information represents the design rationale upon which the specification is based 
and, thus, design rationale is integrated directly into the specification. Each level also contains 
information about underlying assumptions upon which the design and validation is based. 
Assumptions are especially important in operational safety analyses. When conditions change 
such that the assumptions are no longer true, then a new safety analysis should be triggered. 
These assumptions may be included in a safety analysis document (or at least should be), but are 
not usually traced to the parts of the implementation they affect. Thus the system safety engineer 
may know that a safety analysis has changed (e.g., the pacemakers are now being used on 
children rather than the adults for which the device was originally designed and validated), but it 
is a very difficult and resource-intensive process to figure out what parts of the design used that 
assumption. 
     Each of the five intent levels is also organized in terms of the more common part-whole 
abstractions, i.e., parallel decomposition and refinement. Each level also contains a specification 
 39
of the requirements and results of verification and validation activities of the information at that 
specification level. 
     The specification as a whole allows a seamless transition from system to component 
(including software) specifications and the integration of formal and informal aspects of system 
and software development. Because the structuring is based on what is know about human 
problem solving, we believe this type of specification will enhance human processing and use of 
specifications and will also enhance our ability to engineer for quality and to build evolvable and 
changeable systems without degrading quality. The structure is designed to facilitate the tracing 
of system-level requirements and constraints into the design and the assurance of various system 
properties (such as safety0 in the initial design and implementation as well as reduce the costs of 
implementing changes and reanalysis when the system is changed, as it inevitably will be.  
     In this document, we try to use industry standard terminology where “shall” represents a 
requirement, “should” denotes an option, “must” represents a constraint and “will” denotes an 
assumption about the environment. We had to guess at some of these because of incompleteness 
in the documents we used to describe ATSA-ITP. Mappings are indicated by pointers. The first 
number or letters of a link tells you where it is located or its type:  
       Number 1-5: the level on which it is located  
       G:  a goal 
       EA: environmental assumption 
       OP: operational behavioral requirement, assumption, or constraint 
       L:  limitation 
       C: non-safety-related design constraint 
       SC: safety-related design constraint 
       STPA-x: the part of the STPA (hazard) analysis involved 
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B.2   Caveats 
 
This specification and safety analysis is only an example. It was created using the information 
we have about ITP, which may be incomplete. In addition, it has had no review from anyone 
outside our research group nor any ITP expert. The underlying assumptions upon which the 
specification is based are not complete due to our lack of knowledge about ITP.
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B.3  Level 1 System-Level Goals, Requirements, Constraints and 
Hazard Analysis 
 
B.3.1  Introduction 
 
The enhanced Airborne Traffic Situational Awareness (ATSA) for “In Trail Procedure” (ITP) 
enables either leading or following Same Track aircraft to perform a climb or descent to a 
Requested Flight Level through Intervening Flight Levels. The application will require the crew 
to use information derived on the aircraft to determine if the criteria for applying the ITP 
procedures are met with respect to one or two Reference Aircraft at Intervening Flight Levels.   
     The proposed format of the ITP will entail three broad phases.  First, during the Initiation
Phase, the flight crew of the ITP craft will use the ITP equipment to check that an ITP maneuver 
is possible based on the proscribed criteria.  Once it is determined that the flight level change is 
possible, the flight crew will request clearance from sector Air Traffic Control (ATC).   During 
the next phase, the Instruction Phase, ATC will verify that all ITP criteria are met and then 
communicate an approval or denial of the request back to the ITP flight crew.  In the case of an 
approval, the flight crew will then check all ITP criteria once more.  After all criteria are re-
checked, the flight crew begins the Execution Phase by performing the maneuver and concludes 
it by informing ATC that the maneuver is complete. 
     ITP maneuvers can fall into six categories based on the relative positions of the aircraft 
requesting ITP clearance and the aircraft(s) that it uses as a reference aircraft (RA) during the 
maneuver.  Those categories are: a following climb/descent (where the ITP craft is following the 
RA), a leading climb/descent (where the ITP craft is leading the RA) and a combined leading-
following climb/descent (where the ITP craft has a RA both leading and following it). 
     While the addition of ITP does move some of air traffic controls responsibility (namely, 
determining initial feasibility of a maneuver) into the cockpit, it is not meant to replace the air 
traffic controller who will retain ultimate approval authority. 
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B.3.2  Historical Information 
 
Because of the limited radar coverage in oceanic and other remote airspaces, air traffic 
controllers have historically relied on procedural separation rules to ensure safe traffic.  Aircraft 
in these sectors generally fly long, pre-defined flight paths, and air traffic controllers have few 
options for accurately knowing the positions of all aircraft in a sector at the same time or the 
ability to directly communicate with aircraft. To compensate for these limitations, these sectors 
of the airspace often have much larger separation requirements than those applied to airspace 
with more surveillance and communication coverage.  These large separation minimum mean, 
however, that there are severe limits on the capacity of a given track in a remote airspace. 
     It is often desirable for aircraft to make flight level (FL) changes during long-haul flights.  
Because of the changes in aircraft weight over the course of the flight (as fuel is burned), 
different flight levels will allow for greater fuel efficiency.  However, because of the large 
separation requirements, it is often the case that a desired flight level might not be available due 
to the presence of “blocking” aircraft in intervening flight levels that fall within the minimum 
longitudinal separation distance. 
     The new In-Trail Procedure (ITP) described in this document would allow many of these 
previously blocked flight level changes to occur.   The details of the procedure were developed 
as part of the Enhanced Oceanic Operations (EOO) research done under the NASA Next 
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) Air Traffic Management Airspace project.  
The primary goal of EOO was the development of the methodologies and procedures necessary 
to reduce the aforementioned longitudinal separation requirements.   Full details of the ITP 
procedure can be found in the Operational Services and Environment Description Document 
(DO-312) produced by RTCA. 
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B.3.3  Environment 
This section describes the environment in which the ITP equipment and procedures need to 
operate,  including how the addition of ITP equipment will interact with other aircraft systems 
already in place.  Because ITP is a procedure applied by both the flight crew and air traffic 
controllers, it affects the work load of these operators. 
ITP Equipment must function within the broader context of general aircraft operations. 
Furthermore, in order to function as desired, the equipment depends on other components within 
and outside of the aircraft.  The primary external links to and from ITP equipment consist of the 
interface with the Flight Crew and the transponder that transmits state data about the ITP and 
Reference Aircraft.  The primary links between the Flight Crew and ATC remain the existing 
Direct Controller-Pilot Communication (DCPC) modes, or communication channels such as 
radio and datalink that do not rely on a third party for communication between ATC and the 
flight crew.  Figure B.1 shows how the ITP equipment will interact with other system 
components in a typical implementation. 
 
Figure B.1  ITP Equipment Interface 
 
Key to Figure : 
 IF-1 =  Encompasses the following: 
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o Position sensor input interface, e.g., at sensor antenna, for Reference Aircraft 
o Sensor outputs for Reference Aircraft 
o Output from Surveillance Transmit Processing (STP) to the ADS-B Transmit function 
 IF-2 = Encompasses the following 
o Position sensor source input interface, e.g., at sensor antenna, for ITP Aircraft  
o Sensor outputs for ITP Aircraft 
 IF-3 = ADS-B link environment  
 IF-4 = ADS-B receive function, generating ADS-B reports for ITP equipment 
 IF-5 through IF-8 are specific to the manufacturer and operator implementation 
 
 
B.3.3.1  State Data 
The data necessary to calculate ITP feasibility consists of position, velocity and time (PVT) 
information for both the ITP aircraft and all surrounding aircraft, especially potentially blocking 
aircraft at intervening flight levels that may impact the desirability of a flight level change.  This 
state data may be calculated from reported data or measured directly by the aircraft in question. 
These describe the items along lines IF-1 and IF-2 in Figure B.1. 
 
 ADS-B Transmit Aircraft Data 
ITP state data for all potentially blocking aircraft will come from ADS-B data for 
surrounding aircraft, hereafter referred to as ‘Transmit Aircraft’. The minimum 
data required consist of Identity, Horizontal Position, Vertical Position, 
Horizontal Velocity, and Surveillance Quality Indication (used to determine if the 
data is of high enough quality to be used for the ITP calculation). 
 Transmit Aircraft Identity 
The identity of all transmit aircraft will be the 24 bit aircraft address within the 
ADS-B message.  This  identity is defined, as per IAO Doc 444 as ‘a group of 
letters, figures or a combination thereof which is either identical to, or the coded 
equivalent of, the aircraft call sign to be used in air-ground communications, and 
which is used to identify  the aircraft in ground-ground air traffic services 
communications.’  This identification is further clarified to be either the call sign 
(e.g. KLM511, AA321, etc) or the registration marking of the aircraft; neither one 
may exceed 7 characters.  
 Transmit Aircraft Horizontal Position 
The transmit aircraft will transmit information that can be used to calculate its 
horizontal position (i.e. latitude, longitude) along with quality indicators (for 
accuracy and integrity) for these values.  This data will be used to calculate 
relative track angle to the ITP aircraft (this angle must be less than 45 or more 
than 315 degrees in order for ITP criteria to be met). 
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 Transmit Aircraft Vertical Position 
The transmit aircraft will send its barometric altitude to demonstrate its vertical 
position. 
 Transmit Aircraft Horizontal Velocity 
The transmit aircraft will transmit its horizontal velocity (ground velocity) along 
with a quality indicator. 
 Receive Aircraft Data 
The receive aircraft—that is the aircraft that seeks to gain clearance for an ITP 
must have the same state data for itself. This includes horizontal position, 
barometric altitude, horizontal velocity, horizontal position accuracy, and 
horizontal velocity accuracy and integrity indicators.  
B.3.3.2   Direct Controller-Pilot Communication 
All communication for ITP is accomplished through Direct Controller-Pilot Communication.  
This may be via a voice communication over radio, or text communication, but there will not be 
a third party relaying messages between the flight crew and air traffic control. 
 
B.3.3.3   Collision Avoidance Systems 
While it is not required that ITP aircraft are equipped with an Airborne Collision Avoidance 
System (or Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System), most aircraft operating within 
procedural airspace will be so equipped.  Although any advisories from an ACAS do not impact 
the ITP calculation, pilots will have the additional situation awareness that is provided by these 
systems. 
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B.3.4  Environmental Assumptions 
This section contains the environmental assumptions upon which the ITP Equipment 
Certification is based.  Any changes to these assumptions may require changes to the 
requirements and therefore the minimum number of assumptions necessary should be made.  Any 
changes to these assumptions should trigger a reevaluation of the requirements, including a 
reevaluation of the safety analysis and safety design features. 
The correct operation of ITP Equipment is based on assumptions about the environment in 
which the equipment operates and the procedure is applied: 
 
[EA.1] ITP as analyzed in this document will be used only in areas of procedural (non-
radar) control—areas of the airspace where procedural separation minima are applied and 
where the air traffic controller has limited ability to obtain real-time traffic information. 
 
[EA.2] High-integrity communications exist between ITP Flight Crew and ATC, e.g. 
CPDLC, SatComm 
 
[EA.3] Any aircraft requesting ITP will have up-to-date ITP equipment on board and a 
crew that is trained in performing ITP. 
 
[EA.4] All other aircraft in the region of the ITP aircraft will be known to the sector 
ATC. 
 
[EA.5] All aircraft will have legal identification numbers known to ATC. 
 
[EA.6] All data transmitted by ADS-B to the ITP aircraft has the level of accuracy 
specified in DO-242A.   
 
[EA.7] All ITP aircraft will meet the airworthiness standards set by the FAA. 
 
[EA.8] Pilots in procedural airspace will not make changes to their own flight clearance 
(such as increasing mach) in order to meet ITP criteria.15 
 
[EA.9] FC will continue to have primary responsibility for the operation of their own 
aircraft and the proper conformance to clearances issued by air traffic control. 
                                                 
15This is included in the environmental assumptions because it intends to address actions taken by a pilot prior to 
requesting clearance for ITP.  In F. J. L. Bussink, et al., "PILOT IN-TRAIL PROCEDURE VALIDATION 
SIMULATION STUDY," (2008), the authors describe an incident when a pilot participating in an ITP simulation 
study realized prior to requesting ITP that his mach differential would not meet criteria, so increased his mach by 
.001 in order to request ITP.  Because this occurs outside of the ITP process, we are classifying it as an 
environmental assumption.
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[EA.10] ATC will continue to have primary responsibility for the safe separation of 
aircraft and the issuance of clearances. 
       
 
B.3.5   Environmental Constraints 
 
[EC.1] The behavior of the ITP equipment must not be degraded by the behavior of or 
interaction with non-ITP equipment. 
 
[EC.2] The behavior of the non-ITP equipment must not be degraded by the behavior or 
interaction with ITP equipment. 
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B.3.6   System Goals 
To provide a procedure that will allow pilots operating in Procedural Airspace to make desired 
Flight Level changes on a more frequent basis, in order to improve both efficiency on these 
tracks while also maintaining safe separation from other aircraft in the vicinity. 
 
[G.1] Provide flight crews operating in Procedural Airspace the ability to determine if a 
flight level change is feasible prior to contacting ATC for clearance. ([SC-FC.2], [1.6], 
[1.8],[2.1],[2.15],[2.32]) 
  
[G.2] Provide flight crews the ability to understand the state of nearby traffic in areas 
not covered by ATC or radar systems. ([1.7],[2.28]) 
 
[G.3] Provide flight crews with the necessary information to communicate to sector 
ATC their intended flight level change and the presence of potentially blocking aircraft. 
([SC-FC.1], [1.3],[2.3]) 
 
[G.3.1] The ITP procedure must not add to the workload of the FC 
 
[G.4] Ensure that Air Traffic Controllers have the necessary information to issue flight 
level change clearances in Procedural airspace and continue to ensure aircraft separation. 
([SC-ATC.1], [SC-FC.1], [1.9],[2.2]) 
 
[G.4.1] The ITP procedure must not add to the workload of the ATC 
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B.3.7   System Limitations 
Some hazards or hazard causes cannot be eliminated or controlled by the system design. 
Decision makers need to decide whether the risk is acceptable. Such decisions may require a risk 
assessment beyond the scope of this document or information we do not have available.  
 
[L.1] The ITP equipment provides no information about nearby aircraft that do not 
transmit ADS-B data. ([2.32]) 
 
[L.2] ITP depends on the accuracy of the transmit aircraft’s data and the ITP aircraft’s 
internal data, including the ADS-B data that is used for clearance calculations.  If any of 
that data is degraded, the separation assurance calculated by ITP will be similarly 
degraded. ([2.1.4],[2.32.4]) 
Rationale: This limitation holds for existing reliance on aircraft data, and for the safe 
completion of procedures other than ITP. 
 
[L.3] Some of the data necessary to determine strict ITP feasibility will only be 
available to the ITP flight crew. ATCs ability to correctly analyze and apply this data 
relies on the ITP flight crew correctly transmitting it to ATC. ([1.3.1],[2.2],[2.3]) 
 
[L.4] The correct implementation of ITP relies on the ITP flight crew’s ability to 
determine that an ITP maneuver is correct and feasible.  ITP will not “alert” the crew that 
ITP may be possible. ([2.1]) 
Rationale: This is included here as a limitation, but it essentially a design choice and is 
covered as such in Level 2.  
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B.3.8   System Control Structure 
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Figure B.2  Control Structure of ASTA-ITP System 
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FigureB.2 shows the high-level control structure for ASTA-ITP. The primary controllers at the 
system level are the air traffic controller and the flight crew. We limit our specification and 
analysis of the system to these two controllers and do not look at higher levels of the socio-
technical system. 
     The flight crew of the ITP aircraft requests clearance from the current controller of the aircraft 
and sends ITP information to be used in granting the clearance. The air traffic controller provides 
a clearance and flight instructions. The flight crew in turn gets information about the satisfaction 
of the ITP criteria from the ITP equipment and uses that and the clearance to execute the 
maneuver.  
     The diagram also shows the flight crew of the reference aircraft used during the ASTA-ITP 
and uses dashed lines to illustrate that while the flow of information, control and feedback 
between the Reference Aircraft (RA) and ATC is not a direct part of ITP16, it plays an important 
role in the implementation and safety of the procedure. 
                                                 
16 The resulting process model of the controller is certainly important to the analysis, but the mechanisms for 
informing that model are not directly part of the new ITP.
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B.3.9    Hazard Analysis 
This section provides an example of a hazard analysis using  System-Theoretic Process Analysis 
(STPA), the details of which can be found in Leveson’s upcoming book, “Engineering A Safer 
World: Systems Thinking Applied to Safety.”17 A description of the process is included, but 
would not be part of a normal intent specification. 
 The general ICAO safety policy concerned is that the addition of any new protocols or 
equipment must not affect the aircraft or other aircraft or air traffic control in a way that can 
adversely affect the safety of the flight. The hazard analysis is used to ensure that the design of 
the ITP equipment and procedures do not violate this policy.  
     A hazard is a system state or set of conditions that, together with a particular set of worst-case 
environmental conditions, will lead to an accident or loss. Hazards are potentially unsafe states 
that the system design should eliminate, and if they cannot be eliminated, then they must be 
controlled.  Table B.1 shows the high-level system hazards we considered for ASTA-ITP. 
Different hazards might be considered depending on decisions by the regulatory agencies and 
international standards. 
 
B.3.9.1   High-Level System Hazards 
 
 
Table B.1:  Hazards Associated with ASTA-ITP 
ID Description 
H-1 A pair of controlled aircraft violate minimum separation standards 
H-2 Aircraft enters unsafe atmospheric region 
H-3 Aircraft enters uncontrolled state 
H-4 
Aircraft enters unsafe attitude (excessive 
turbulence or pitch/roll/yaw that causes 
passenger injury but not necessarily 
aircraft loss)  
H-5 Aircraft enters a prohibited area 
 
 
 
B.3.9.2   Unsafe Control Actions 
Next, for the two controllers with which we are concerned, we must determine how those 
controllers might exert unsafe control on the system—an action that has the potential to result in 
a hazardous system state or the lack of an action needed to prevent a hazardous system state.  In 
the case of ASTA-ITP, the hazardous state that we are most concerned with is H-1: a pair of 
                                                 
17 To be published by MIT Press in Fall 2011, available online: http://sunnyday.mit.edu/safer-world/safer-world.pdf
 53
controlled aircraft violates minimum separation standards. We considered the other hazards but 
did not find that introducing ITP over oceanic airspace could lead to them. If ITP is used in other 
airspace or under other conditions, then the other hazards must be analyzed (see Environmental 
Assumption EA.1). 
A controller can provide unsafe control in four ways  
1. An unsafe control action is provided that moves the system into a hazardous state 
2. Control actions required for safety are not provided (that is, a hazard occurs due to lack 
of a control action) 
3. Necessary control actions for safety are provided by at the wrong time or in the wrong 
sequence 
4. A control action required for safety is stopped too soon or applied too long. 
     To assist in identifying the hazardous control actions, we use a table to look at all these 
possibilities for each of the control actions. Only some of them will turn out to be hazardous but 
considering all incorrect control actions will identify those that are hazardous under certain 
conditions.  
      The responsibilities of the Air Traffic Controller are to process the ITP request of the flight 
crew, which involves analyzing the ITP data and the traffic in the area and to communicate 
approval or denial of the request. The control actions provided by the Air Traffic Controller are 
to approve the ITP request, to deny the ITP request, or to tell the flight crew to abort the 
procedure.   
     Table B.2 summarizes the hazardous control actions by ATC. 
     At this level in the analysis, the control actions are considered at a very high level. Later 
analysis, if necessary, will break these high-level control actions into their constituent pieces. 
That is, instead of considering a very specific action (e.g. “pilot uses aircraft elevators to increase 
flight level”) we have focused specifically on the control actions of the ITP as a process (e.g. 
“pilot performs ITP”).  For the purposes of providing requirements for ITP, the specific details of 
how to fly an aircraft or how to direct air traffic do not need to be analyzed—we instead focus on 
the procedure itself as a control action, and not the individual actions of each controller that 
comprise the procedure at this first high-level analysis. 

Table B.2:   Unsafe Control Actions for Air Traffic Control 
Control 
Action 
Not Providing 
Causes Hazard 
Providing 
Causes Hazard 
Wrong 
Timing/Order 
Causes Hazard 
Stopped Too 
Soon or 
Applied Too 
Long 
Approve 
ITP request 
 Approval given 
when criteria are 
not met 
 
Approval given to 
incorrect aircraft 
Approval given 
too early 
 
Approval given 
too late 
 
Deny ITP 
request 
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Abnormal 
Termination 
Instruction 
Aircraft should 
abort but 
instruction not 
given 
Abort instruction 
given when abort 
is not necessary 
Abort 
instruction given 
too late 
  
  
 
Four control actions of the air traffic controller are identified as unsafe in Table B.2 and need to 
be further analyzed to determine their potential causes.  The reasons why these are unsafe should 
be fairly obvious: an incorrect or out of sequence ITP approval can directly lead to loss of 
separation, and an unnecessary or incorrect abnormal termination command introduces 
unnecessary maneuvering under uncertain conditions.   
     The reason why some of the boxes are empty and thus not considered to be unsafe and subject 
to further analysis may be less clear.  ATC not giving ITP approval is not unsafe because the 
aircraft will continue on its original flight path (or if it does not, this control action would be an 
example of the flight crew incorrectly executing ITP, which is captured in the analysis of the 
flight crew).  Likewise, the control action of denying the request may be incorrectly given—that 
is, ATC may deny a request even though all ITP criteria are met—but because denial of request 
will mean that the ITP aircraft continues on its flight path, this action will not result in an unsafe 
scenario.  The control actions are discrete so stopped too soon or applied too long are not 
relevant in this case. 
The flight crew can execute the ITP or abort it.  
 55
Table B.3:  Unsafe Control Actions for ITP Flight Crew 

Control 
Action 
Not Providing 
Causes Hazard 
Providing 
Causes Hazard 
Wrong  
Timing/Order 
Causes Hazard 
Stopped Too 
Soon/Applied 
Too Long 
Execute ITP  
ITP executed 
when not 
approved 
 
ITP executed 
when ITP criteria 
are not satisfied 
 
ITP executed with 
incorrect climb 
rate, final altitude, 
etc 
ITP executed 
too soon before 
approval 
 
ITP executed 
too late 
 
Abnormal 
Termination 
of ITP 
FC continues 
with maneuver 
in dangerous 
situation 
FC aborts 
unnecessarily 
 
FC does not 
follow regional 
procedures while 
aborting 
   
 
 
Four inadequate control actions of the ITP flight crew are identified as potentially unsafe in  
B.3.  Again, these are self-explanatory:  when the flight crew incorrectly executes the ITP or 
does so out of sequence (which we define as prior to receiving approval or not immediately after 
receiving approval) or does not initiated an abnormal termination or does so incorrectly, this 
action may very clearly put the ITP aircraft in proximity of a nearby aircraft.  The other 
inadequate control actions are not highlighted as unsafe for one of three reasons.  They are either 
not unsafe, as is the case of the flight crew not executing IT, they are logically identical to other 
inadequate control actions (e.g., ITP executed beyond final altitude), or they are illogical (ITP 
cannot be abnormally terminated if it has not begun or has already completed).  
     The 14 identified unsafe control actions (hazards) can be translated into high-level safety 
constraints on the air traffic controller and the flight crew:   
 
[SC-ATC.1] Approval of an ITP request must be given only when the ITP criteria are 
met. (STPA-ATC.1, [1.14]) 
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
Hazard: H1
1) Unsafe Control Action: ATC Approval Given to Incorrect 
Aircraft 

Process Model Link Cause 
(1) Inadequate Control Algorithm Algorithm does not include a check / verification of aircraft ID 
(2) Process Model Inconsistent Abundance of aircraft in particular area of sector 
Other aircraft (non-requesting a/c) in airspace 
with similar state data or aircraft ID 
  Other simultaneous requests occur within the ATC domain, including ITP or non-ITP requests 
  
ATC confuses the Reference and ITP aircraft. 
This could be due to lack of understanding of ITP 
architecture, or to a simple “slip” 
(3) Inadequate actuator operation Communication channel to flight crew becomes corrupted 
(4) Component Failures/ Changes over 
time  
(5) Inadequate sensor operation Datalink becomes corrupted 
(6) Incorrect or no information provided 
(by flight crew) 
Flight crew incorrectly transcribes data into 
CPDLC 
 Flight crew does not included aircraft ID in ITP request 
(7) Inadequate or missing feedback to 
controller, feedback delays 
Incorrect Aircraft (non ITP requesting) confirms 
or accepts approval 
 
Incorrect Aircraft does not immediately respond 
about discrepancy (i.e. flight crew does not 
indicate to the ATC soon enough that it is 
incorrect recipient) 
 
[SC-ATC.2] Approval must be given to the requesting aircraft only. (STPA-ATC.2, 
[1.12], [1.14]) 
 
[SC-ATC.3] Approval must not be given too early or too late (STPA-ATC.3, [1.17]) 
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[SC-ATC.4] An abnormal termination instruction must be given when continuing the 
ITP would be unsafe (STPA-ATC.4, [1.15], [1.16]) 
 
[SC-ATC.5] An abnormal termination instruction must not be given when it is not 
required to maintain safety and would result in a loss of separation. (STPA-ATC.5, 
[1.22.3]) 
 
[SC-ATC.6] An abnormal termination instruction must be given immediately if an 
abort is required (STPA-ATC.6, [1.22]) 
The constraints on the flight crew are: 
 
[SC-FC.1] The flight crew must not execute the ITP when it has not been approved by ATC. 
(B.11:  STPA-FC.2, [1.27], [1.28]) 
 
[SC-FC.2] The flight crew must not execute an ITP when the ITP criteria are not satisfied 
( STPA-FC.1, [1.23], [1.24], [1.27]) 
 
[SC-FC.3] The flight crew must execute the ITP with correct climb rate, flight levels, mach 
number, and other associated performance criteria ( STPA-FC.1, [1.30]) 
 
[SC-FC.4] The flight crew must not continue the ITP maneuver when it would be dangerous 
to do so ( STPA-FC.1, B.12   STPA-FC.3, [1.33]) 
 
[SC-FC.5] The flight crew must not abort the ITP unnecessarily.  (Rationale: An abort may 
violate separation minimums) (  STPA-FC.4, [1.33.5]) 
 
[SC-FC.6] When performing an abort, the flight crew must follow regional procedures (  
STPA-FC.4, [1.33]) 
 
[SC-FC.7] The flight crew must not execute the ITP before approval by ATC (B.11:  
STPA-FC.2) 
 
[SC-FC.8] The flight crew must execute the ITP immediately when approved unless it would 
be           dangerous to do so. (B.11:  STPA-FC.2, [1.29]) 
 
 
B.3.9.2   Causal Analysis 
The next step of STPA is to use the control loops of each controller to determine how each of 
the 14 identified unsafe control actions (6 for the ATC, 7 for the ITP flight crew) could occur.  
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Figure B.4 and B.5 show the generic control loops for each of these controllers, followed by 
a table for each of the 13 unsafe control actions, detailing how problems or errors in each part of 
the control loop might lead to each of the unsafe control actions.  STPA uses a generic feedback 
control loop model in which the controller exerts a control action on an actuator, which then 
changes the state of the controlled process.  Changes to the process may be fed back to the 
controller via a sensor, and subsequent control actions may be based on this feedback.  STPA 
examines each of these components—the controller (including the control algorithm and the 
process model it uses), the actuator, the process itself, and the sensor—as well as the connections 
between these parts to identify reasons why each of the above unsafe control actions may occur.  
The identification of unsafe control actions (the arrow between the controller and the actuator) 
was the first step of STPA, and the casual analysis occurs on the remaining pieces of the control 
loop.  
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Figure B.3  Control Loop for ATC during ITP 
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Figure B.4  Control Loop for ITP Flight Crew during ITP 
 
  The above diagrams omit any detail on the arrows between the controller and the actuator 
(upper left-hand portion of diagrams) because the analysis of how the control action may be 
inappropriate, ineffective or missing is the first step of STPA and can be found in the figures 
above (Figure B.3 and Figure B.4). Likewise failures in the links between the actuator and the 
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controlled process are captured already: in the case of the ATC control loop: a failure between 
the actuator (an individual flight crew) and the process (air traffic) applicable to ITP will be 
captured as a failure of the pilot to exert his own control and in the case of the ITP flight crew, a 
failure of the actuator implies equipment failure at the component level (e.g. the 
rudder/throttle/yoke fails). 
     For both the ATC and the ITP FC, one of the sensors involved in the process is a human 
operator(s), and the upper-right loop in Figures B.3 and B.4 are the communication channels 
between ATC and the FC.  To examine the lower portion of this feedback, the connection 
between the process and the sensor, is to examine reasons why the process may not provide 
feedback.  For example, when considering ATC as the controller, this would include reasons 
why the pilot may not provide feedback (in the case of pilot as controller this would include 
reasons why the equipment may not provide feedback).  Likewise, the upper portion of the 
feedback, the link between sensor and controller, examines reasons why the controller (ATC) 
may not receive feedback provided by the controlled system or may receive inaccurate feedback. 
     For each of the unsafe control actions identified above, STPA analyzes each part of this loop 
to determine the general causes of that unsafe action throughout the loop.18  At this first-level 
stage of the analysis these causes are purposefully general—there may be hundreds of reasons 
why the pilot may believe that he or she has received approval when he or she has not, the 
purpose of this level is not necessarily to identify all of those scenarios, but to ensure that there 
are appropriate requirements in place to mitigate the effect (potential hazardous scenario) of this 
situation.  Also, some of the links on the control process diagram may not lead to an unsafe 
control action, and there may not be realistic causes for all pieces of the control process for all 
unsafe control actions.  Finally, no hazard analysis can ever be complete—there are certainly 
scenarios and casual factors that any analysis will miss, including STPA.  STPA merely provides 
a more structured framework to complete the analysis and will cast a wider casual net than other, 
more traditional, methods of hazard analysis because it looks at more than just component 
failures or faults. 
 
                                                 
18 When reading the causal tables, one should interpret the item in the “Cause” column as “a reason for which the 
unsafe control action in question may arise and lead to the specified hazard.”  Organizing these causes by their 
location in the control process loop is merely a way to systemically analyze all of the pieces of the control process—
in many cases a particular cause may arguably fit into several pieces of the control loop.  The distinction between 
whether or not, for example, “ATC believes that ITP FC will initiate an abnormal termination when necessary” is 
best defined as an inadequate control algorithm instead of a process model flaw is not important, as long as the 
process for defining all the causes is complete enough that they arise at some point during the analysis.
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B.3.9.3
 
Table B.4:  STPA-ATC.1 
Hazard: H1

1)  Unsafe Control Action: ATC Approval Given When ITP Criteria 
Not Met 

Process Model Link Cause 
(1) Inadequate Control Algorithm ATC does not check to see if normal FL change is possible 
 ATC does not wait for pertinent updates from nearby aircraft prior to approving ITP 
 ATC does not communicate details of ITPs in process between separate controllers or sectors 
 ATC does not ask for required information missing from request before approving 
 ATC does not check to see if there are other blocking aircraft in the vicinity of the ITP 
 ATC does not verify that ITP criteria (distance, same track status) are met 
(2) Process Model Inconsistent Controller believes that aircraft is on a flight path/plan that it is not 
ATC understanding of aircraft velocity is wrong 
  ATCs understanding of aircraft location is wrong 
  ATC understanding of number of aircraft in sector is wrong 
  ATC unaware of another ITP currently in progress 
  ATC believes that traffic volume in future will change 
  ATC believes that communication channel (radio, datalink) is correct to use when it is not 
  ATC believes that the weather to be good when it 
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is not 
(3) Inadequate actuator operation Flight Crew does not carry out clearance as specified by ATC 
(4) Component Failures/ Changes over 
time   
(5) Inadequate sensor operation ATC does not understand or receive information on the state of traffic in the sector 
(6) Incorrect or no information provided 
(by flight crew) 
Pilot in sector does not give status to ATC when 
over fix point 
(7) Inadequate or missing feedback to 
controller, feedback delays ATC does not receive feedback from flight crew 
 Feedback from pilots delayed to ATC 
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Table B.5:   STPA-ATC.2 
Hazard: H1
2) Unsafe Control Action: ATC Approval Given to Incorrect 
Aircraft 

Process Model Link Cause 
(1) Inadequate Control Algorithm Algorithm does not include a check / verification of aircraft ID 
(2) Process Model Inconsistent Abundance of aircraft in particular area of sector 
Other aircraft (non-requesting a/c) in airspace 
with similar state data or aircraft ID 
  Other simultaneous requests occur within the ATC domain, including ITP or non-ITP requests 
  
ATC confuses the Reference and ITP aircraft. 
This could be due to lack of understanding of ITP 
architecture, or to a simple “slip” 
(3) Inadequate actuator operation Communication channel to flight crew becomes corrupted 
(4) Component Failures/ Changes over 
time  
(5) Inadequate sensor operation Datalink becomes corrupted 
(6) Incorrect or no information provided 
(by flight crew) 
Flight crew incorrectly transcribes data into 
CPDLC 
 Flight crew does not included aircraft ID in ITP request 
(7) Inadequate or missing feedback to 
controller, feedback delays 
Incorrect Aircraft (non ITP requesting) confirms 
or accepts approval 
 
Incorrect Aircraft does not immediately respond 
about discrepancy (i.e. flight crew does not 
indicate to the ATC soon enough that it is 
incorrect recipient) 
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Table B.6:   STPA-ATC.3 
Hazard: H1
3) Unsafe Control Action: ATC Approval Given too Early or Late 

Process Model Link Cause 
(1) Inadequate Control Algorithm ATC gives approval before request is complete 
 ATC delays in giving approval 
(2) Process Model Inconsistent ATC believes that they have all necessary information to grant approval when they do not 
ATC believes they are answering request 
promptly when there has been a delay 
  ATC believes that request from pilot is complete when it is not 
(3) Inadequate actuator operation Delay in pilot-controller communication  
(4) Component Failures/ Changes over 
time   
(5) Inadequate sensor operation Missing or dropped messages between FC and ATC 
(6) Incorrect or no information provided 
(by flight crew) FC does not complete request to ATC 
 FC does not ask for clarification from ATC when request received out of order 
(7) Inadequate or missing feedback to 
controller, feedback delays Request received by ATC is incomplete 
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Table B.7:  STPA-ATC.4 
Hazard: H1
4) Unsafe Control Action: ATC does not give abnormal termination 
instruction 

Process Model Link Cause 
(1) Inadequate Control Algorithm ATC unaware that an abnormal termination is possible 
 ATC does not know conditions under which abnormal termination should be issued 
 ATC does not continue to monitor ITP flight after granting approval 
(2) Process Model Inconsistent 
ATC believes that pilot has more situational 
awareness of nearby traffic and will recognize 
need to abnormally terminate ITP  
ATC does not know that ITP conditions are 
dangerous 
  
ATC attempts to maneuver any non-ITP plane out 
of dangerous traffic while ITP plane is changing 
flight level 
(3) Inadequate actuator operation   
(4) Component Failures/ Changes over 
time   
(5) Inadequate sensor operation   
(6) Incorrect or no information provided 
(by flight crew) 
Flight Crew does not alert ATC to potentially 
hazardous traffic situation 
(7) Inadequate or missing feedback to 
controller, feedback delays 
ATC does not recognize or acknowledge 
information from FC about hazardous traffic 
situation 
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Table B.8:  STPA-ATC.5 
Hazard: H1
5) Unsafe Control Action: ATC gives abnormal termination 
instruction when it not needed 

Process Model Link Cause 
(1) Inadequate Control Algorithm ATC gives abnormal termination instruction before verifying that it is necessary 
 
ATC gives abnormal termination instruction after 
realizing they made a mistake in issuing the 
original clearance, but without checking to see if 
the mistake was trivial 
(2) Process Model Inconsistent ATC believes traffic situation to be hazardous for ITP aircraft when it is not 
ATC gets conflicting information about the state 
of traffic from another source 
(3) Inadequate actuator operation Abnormal termination issued to incorrect aircraft 
(4) Component Failures/ Changes over 
time   
(5) Inadequate sensor operation   
(6) Incorrect or no information provided 
(by flight crew)   
(7) Inadequate or missing feedback to 
controller, feedback delays   
 
 68
 
Table B.9:  STPA-ATC.6 
Hazard: H1
6) Unsafe Control Action: ATC gives abnormal termination 
instruction too late 

Process Model Link Cause 
(1) Inadequate Control Algorithm ATC takes too long to observe anomalous air traffic condition 
(2) Process Model Inconsistent  
(3) Inadequate actuator operation Communication delay, e.g. datalink message throughput issue 
(4) Component Failures/ Changes over 
time  
(5) Inadequate sensor operation Refresh rate on ATM screen or weather data is too slow 
(6) Incorrect or no information provided 
(by flight crew)   
(7) Inadequate or missing feedback to 
controller, feedback delays 
Not all aircraft in air space report, report too late, 
or at incorrect time 
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3.9.3.4
Table B.10:  STPA-FC.1 
Hazard: H1
1) Unsafe Control Action: The flight crew executes an ITP when 
the ITP criteria are not satisfied
2) The flight crew executes ITP with incorrect climb rate, flight 
levels, mach number, and other associated performance 
criteria
Process Model Link Cause 
(1) Inadequate Control Algorithm 
Flight Crew does not correctly check that ITP is 
appropriate (that normal FL change could not 
occur) 
 Flight Crew does not check that all ITP criteria are met 
 
Flight Crew does not re-verify that conditions 
have not changed from when they were originally 
checked after receiving approval 
 Flight Crew does not confirm the established flight level after finishing the maneuver 
(2) Process Model Inconsistent Flight Crew believes that their climb/descend capability is greater than it is 
Flight Crew believes it has all ADS-B data for 
local traffic 
  Flight Crew believes ADS-B data to be accurate when it is not 
  
Flight Crew believes ITP criteria (speed, distance, 
relative altitude, relative angle) to be different 
than it is 
  Flight Crew believes communication protocols with ATC to be different than they are 
  Flight Crew believes communication protocols with nearby aircraft to be different than they are 
  
Individual members of the flight crew of a 
different understanding of how responsibilities 
are divided among them 
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Hazard: H1
1) Unsafe Control Action: The flight crew executes an ITP when 
the ITP criteria are not satisfied
2) The flight crew executes ITP with incorrect climb rate, flight 
levels, mach number, and other associated performance 
criteria
  Flight Crew believes weather/turbulence to be better than it is 
(3) Inadequate actuator operation   
(4) Changes over time (to aircraft)   
(5) Inadequate sensor operation Flight Crew does not understand ITP data 
(6) Control input or external information 
wrong or missing Flight Crew lacking information from ATC 
ITP Equipment give incorrect or ambiguous state 
information 
(7) Incorrect or no information provided 
(to sensor)  
Information about other aircraft not received by 
ADS-B 
(8) Inadequate or missing feedback Change in own velocity/altitude/bearing not displayed to pilot 
 Change in the velocity/altitude/bearing of nearby ship not displayed to pilot 
 Proper aircraft identifier of nearby aircraft not displayed to pilot 
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Table B.11:  STPA-FC.2 
Hazard: H1
3) Unsafe Control Action: ITP FC executes without ATC Approval 
4) ITP FC executes ITP out of sequence 

Process Model Link Cause 
(1) Inadequate Control Algorithm Flight Crew begins ITP maneuver prior to receiving approval 
 Flight Crew delays in executing ITP after receiving approval 
(2) Process Model Inconsistent Flight Crew believes ITP request to be approved when it is not 
  Flight Crew believes approval to be recent when it is old 
(3) Inadequate actuator operation   
(4) Changes over time (to aircraft)   
(5) Inadequate sensor operation Flight Crew does not understand or correctly apply ITP data from ITP equipment 
(6) Control input or external information 
wrong or missing 
ATC approval not on communication channel that 
FC is monitoring 
  ITP Equipment provides criteria data too late 
(7) Incorrect or no information provided 
(to sensor)  
ADS-B data on other aircrafts is outdated or 
incomplete 
(8) Inadequate or missing feedback FC does not receive communication from ATC 
 FC does not receive local traffic information from ADS-B 
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Table B.12   STPA-FC.3 
Hazard: H1
3) Unsafe Control Action: ITP FC does not perform abnormal 
termination 

Process Model Link Cause 
(1) Inadequate Control Algorithm FC does not know the conditions under which an abnormal termination should be initiated 
 FC waits for abnormal termination instruction from ATC 
 FC does not monitor local traffic while performing ITP maneuver 
(2) Process Model Inconsistent FC believes that ATC is monitoring traffic conditions 
FC believes that hazardous situation will be 
resolved by the maneuver of another aircraft 
  
FC does not realize that they are violating ITP 
criteria (e.g. unable to maintain minimum climb 
rate) 
(3) Inadequate actuator operation   
(4) Changes over time (to aircraft)   
(5) Inadequate sensor operation   
(6) Control input or external information 
wrong or missing 
FC does not receive or does not heed collision 
avoidance message (TCAS) during ITP maneuver 
  
(7) Incorrect or no information provided 
(to sensor)    
(8) Inadequate or missing feedback   
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Table B.13:  STPA-FC.4 
Hazard: H1
5) Unsafe Control Action: ITP FC performs abnormal 
termination incorrectly 
6) When performing an abort, the flight crew must follow 
regional procedures 
Process Model Link Cause 
(1) Inadequate Control Algorithm 
FC does not know procedure for completing 
abnormal termination (e.g. regional contingency 
plans) 
 FC does not know the conditions under which an abnormal termination should occur 
(2) Process Model Inconsistent FC believes that abnormal termination is necessary when it is not 
FC believes that there is hazardous local traffic 
when there is not 
  FC believes that ATC incorrectly granted ITP clearance 
  FC believes that regional contingency procedures are different than they are 
(3) Inadequate actuator operation Equipment failure (e.g. aircraft unable to maintain correct climb/descent rate) 
(4) Changes over time (to aircraft)   
(5) Inadequate sensor operation 
Change in ITP data displayed to FC during 
maneuver causes them to initiate abnormal 
termination 
(6) Control input or external information 
wrong or missing 
FC unable to contact ATC during maneuver or to 
confirm completion 
(7) Incorrect or no information provided 
(to sensor)  
Equipment failure in ITP aircraft (e.g. altimeter 
not registering FL change) 
(8) Inadequate or missing feedback FC loses feedback from own plane 
 FC loses external feedback (ADS-B, TCAS) 
The causes identified in these tables are used later to refine the safety requirements and 
constraints. 
 74
B.3.10   High-Level Functional Requirements and Constraints 
The requirements described in this section focus on the general goals of the ITP process and 
equipment.  Specific requirements on the operators—the ITP flight crew and sector Air Traffic 
Control—are described in the section, “Operator Requirements.”  Use of the term “ITP” refers to 
the procedure, specifically to the methods used to train pilots and controllers and the steps of the 
procedure itself.  “ITP equipment” refers to the display unit that ITP aircraft will be equipped 
with, which displays all of the relevant and necessary state data and whether the criteria are met. 
     Requirements that are derived from the STPA hazard analysis described below will refer to 
the portion of STPA from which they are derived in the format: STPA-x.y.z, where x=controller 
(ATC or ITP FC), y = the casual analysis table referenced (1, 2, etc), and z=the number of the 
process model link as specific in the hazard analysis casual tables. 
B.3.10.1  Design and Safety Constraints 
Design constraints are limitations on how requirements may be achieved, that is, on 
potential system designs. 
B.3.10.1.1   Non-Safety Constraints 
 
[C.1] The design of both the procedure for ITP and the ITP equipment must not 
preclude future changes or modification to procedures used in procedural airspace. 
([EA.1],[G.1]) 
 
[C.2] Both the procedure and the equipment must be compatible with existing methods 
of separation control in procedural airspace. ([EA.1],[EC.1]) 
 
[C.3] Both the procedure and the equipment used for ITP must meet all applicable 
FAA, FCC and ICAO policies, rules, and philosophies. ([EA.7]) 
  
[C.4] All ITP certified aircraft must be ADS-B equipped and must make use of the 
ADS-B data of nearby aircraft for calculating ITP criteria. ([EA.6],[G.1]) 
 
[C.5] The desirability of performing a flight level change under ITP must be acceptable 
by both the flight crew and the air traffic controllers. ([EA.4],[G.4]) 
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B.3.10.1.2   Safety Constraints 
 
For a system to be safe the safety constraints (constraints on the states of the system) must not be 
violated or a hazard will result. The safety constraints must be enforced by the safety control 
structure of the system. Accidents result when the control actions necessary to enforce the safety 
constraints are not provided, are provided by at the wrong time or in the wrong time, are stopped 
too soon or applied too long, or when appropriate control actions are provided but not followed. 
In designing a safe system, the safety constraints must be identified and then the appropriate 
controls or mitigation measures implemented (as described in Level 2 of the Intent 
Specification). 
     The hazard analysis is used to identify the required safety constraints. These constraints arise 
from the general ICAO safety policy that the addition of any new ITP-related protocols or 
equipment will not affect the aircraft or other aircraft or air traffic control in a way that can 
adversely affect the safety of the flight. 
 
[1.1]  
All ITP related protocols must not conflict or interfere with existing protocols 
 
[1.1.1]  
Requesting and executing an ITP must not interfere with the FCs ability to monitor 
and attend to the health of their aircraft ([G.3]) 
 
[1.1.2]  
Receiving and providing clearance for ITP must not interfere with ATC ability to 
monitor and attend to the health of the airspace ([G.4]) 
[1.2]  
ITP shall provide the flight crews of aircraft operating in procedural airspace the ability 
to determine if an ITP maneuver is appropriate and the communication protocols 
(channels, syntax, request formatting) for receiving clearance from ATC and conditions 
under which the maneuver should be abnormally terminated. (STPA-ATC.1, STPA-
FC.1,B.11:  STPA-FC.2, [2.1]) 
 
[1.3]  
ITP training shall be provided for all controllers (flight crew and air traffic) in all ITP 
procedures.  In addition to all of the operational requirements detailed in Level 2, training 
shall include ([G.1],[2.1]): 
 
 76
[1.3.1]  
Communication protocols (both channels and appropriate syntax) between flight 
crew and air traffic control (STPA-ATC.1, STPA-FC.1,B.11:  STPA-FC.2) 
 
 
[1.3.2]  
The expected order of all ITP related communications and methods for both ATC 
and FC to determine how to treat an out of order or unexpected communication 
(STPA-ATC.2) 
 
[1.3.3]  
Roles and responsibilities of each member of the ITP FC in executing the ITP 
procedure ( STPA-FC.1) 
Assumption: Roles and responsibilities may be clearly tied to general flight 
responsibilities (for example, if the co-pilot is responsible for all ATC 
communication and the pilot is responsible for flying the plane, this will also be 
the division of duties during ITP), but the ITP procedure needs to clearly indicate 
these roles in order to avoid confusion, especially during unexpected or abnormal 
circumstances.
 
[1.3.4]  
ITP training must include conditions under which an abnormal termination of ITP 
should be initiated by the FC and by ATC (STPA-ATC.3,B.12   STPA-FC.3,  
STPA-FC.4) 
 
[1.4]  
The ITP FC must be provided a means of determining their ownship climb / descend 
capability and clearance data ([G.2],[G.3],  STPA-FC.1,[2.1],[2.15]) 
Assumption: The ITP equipment may display this data, but we assume that if it 
does not, the pilots should know it or be able to find it anyway, as a general 
requirement of safe aircraft operation. 
[1.5]  
ADS-B transponder on ITP aircraft must be certified and regularly tested ([EA.6] 
,[2.32]) 
Assumption: The certification authorities in each country will determine the 
certification requirements for ADS-B or will refer to DO-242A 
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B.10.3.2   ITP Equipment 
[1.6]  
ITP equipment shall display information to the crew in a manner that does not distract or 
confuse them ([G.1],  STPA-FC.1,[2.15]) 
 
[1.7]  
ITP equipment shall display all  state data for nearby ADS-B aircraft required for the 
pilot to determine if the ITP criteria have been met ([G.1], [G.2],  STPA-FC.1, 
[2.15]) 
 
[1.7.1] ITP equipment shall display that the ITP criteria are met if and only if the 
criteria are met. ([G.2]) 
 
[1.7.2] ITP equipment shall display information about all nearby aircraft in a way 
that is clear and understandable to the flight crew. ( [G.2],[G.3], STPA-FC.1) 
 
[1.7.3] ITP equipment shall display data quality indicators for all derived data ( 
STPA-FC.1) 
 
[1.8]  
ITP Equipment shall provide state data necessary to determine ITP feasibility  ([G.1],  
STPA-FC.1,B.11:  STPA-FC.2), ([2.15][2.16]) 
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B.3.10.3    Operator Requirements and Constraints
This section covers the assumptions, requirements and constraints involving operator behavior.
In the case of ASTA-ITP there are two general operators that we are concerned with: the flight 
crew of the ITP requesting aircraft and the Air Traffic Controller of the sector in which the ITP 
maneuver is requested.  This information is used in the design of the ITP equipment interface, the 
ITP logic, the procedures followed by the flight crew and air traffic control, and training plans 
and programs. 
B.3.10.4  ATC Requirements and Constraints 
 
[1.9]  
If ATC is not receiving status updates (e.g. at fix points) from any aircraft in sector, they 
must not issue ITP clearance ([SC-ATC.1], STPA-ATC.1) 
 
[1.10]  
Prior to issuing ITP clearance, ATC must verify that a normal flight level change is not 
possible ([SC-ATC.1], STPA-ATC.1) 
 
[1.11]  
If ATC is receiving data from a RA while ITP request is made (via normal fix point 
update or otherwise) they must wait for data from other aircraft prior to issuing ITP 
clearance (STPA-ATC.1) 
 
[1.12]  
Controllers must communicate details of ITP clearances granted (ITP craft and RA 
involved) in real time to other controllers in the same or nearby sectors (STPA-ATC.1, 
STPA-ATC.2) 
Rationale: This is to ensure that multiple ITP maneuvers do not occur in the same 
portion of the airspace 
 
[1.13]  
ATC must request information missing from ITP request from FC prior to issuing ITP 
clearance (STPA-ATC.1, [2.12]) 
 
[1.14]  
ATC must verify all data prior to issuing an ITP clearance. ATC must “sanity check” 
other data to ensure that it is realistic ([SC-ATC.1], [2.14],[2.15]) 
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[1.15]  
ATC must monitor aircraft in their sector and know the flight plans for those aircraft, and 
if ATC believes requests are inconsistent with the ATC’s data then they must not grant 
ITP clearance ([L.1], STPA-ATC.1) 
 
Assumption: ATC will have this knowledge as part of their overall ability to maintain 
separation, regardless of ITP clearances.  
 
 
[1.16]  
ATC must have access to current19 knowledge of the state data of all aircraft involved in 
ITP request, both the requesting aircraft as well as any potentially blocking aircraft, 
including position, velocity, flight level and other aircraft states ([SC-ATC.3],STPA-
ATC.1, [2.17][2.18]) 
 
Assumption: ATC will monitor air traffic using radar, ADS-B, or other measures have 
this knowledge as part of their overall ability to maintain separation, regardless of ITP 
clearances.  
 
[1.16.1]  
ATC must not use any assumptions about the future state of the airspace when 
granting ITP clearance (STPA-ATC.1)   
 
Rationale: The potential exists for the ATC (or flight crews) to anticipate that ITP 
criteria will be met based on present conditions. This should be avoided and 
clearances only granted on the current state. 
 
[1.17]  
ATC must grant clearance for ITP within TBD minutes of request ([SC-ATC.3],STPA-
ATC.2) 
 
[1.17.1]  
ATC must be provided a mechanism for knowing how much time has elapsed 
since the ITP request was made (STPA-ATC.2) 
 
                                                 
19 “Current” in procedural airspace may rely on the air traffic controller expertise or consensus of what qualifies as 
current. It must be much less than 5 minutes, since several of the other requirements pertain to
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[1.18]  
ATC must be provided with all ITP criteria values ([SC-ATC.1], STPA-ATC.2, 
[2.12][2.14][2.15]) 
 
Assumption: This could be a document that can be looked up real-time, or numbers on a 
screen. 
 
[1.19]  
ATC shall follow a contingency plan if communications with FC fail (STPA-ATC.2, 
[1.35]) 
 
Rationale: ATC depends on flight crew communication to determine the state of aircraft 
that are not in procedural separation. Therefore a contingency plan is necessary if 
communication has not been properly verified.
 
[1.19.1]  
ATC must not approve additional ITP maneuvers until existing ITP has been 
completed and confirmed through formal communication channel 
 
[1.19.2]  
ATC shall request communication with ITP FC if confirmation has not been 
received within TBD minutes 
 
[1.19.3]  
ATC shall request procedural separation for all aircraft domain until 
communication verification has been received from ITP FC 
 
[1.20]  
ATC shall prioritize communication with an aircraft performing an ITP maneuver over 
other aircraft not maneuvering (STPA-ATC.3) 
 
[1.20.1]  
ATC shall relate all pertinent traffic and safety information promptly to ITP FC 
( STPA-FC.1) 
 
[1.21]  
ATC shall continue to monitor ITP aircraft and surrounding aircraft (such as RA) while 
ITP maneuver is in progress (STPA-ATC.3) 
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[1.22]  
If ATC notices a potentially hazardous traffic scenario, they must assess if an abnormal 
termination of the ITP maneuver is necessary, and initiate it if so ([SC-ATC.4], STPA-
ATC.3) 
 
[1.22.1]  
ATC must determine when traffic surrounding an ITP maneuver may enter into a 
hazardous state such as inclement weather of violation of procedural airspace 
constraints (STPA-ATC.4) 
 
[1.22.2]  
If ATC is using traffic data from multiple sources to monitor traffic surrounding an 
ITP maneuver, they must be provided with a clearly defined hierarchy of which 
data to use (STPA-ATC.4) 
 
[1.22.3]  
ATC must not issue abnormal termination commands without cause (STPA-
ATC.4) 
 
[1.22.4]  
If ATC becomes aware of a mistake made during the original ITP clearance, they 
must assess if the mistake could be hazardous prior to terminating the ITP 
(STPA-ATC.4) 
 
[1.22.5]  
ATC must not approve an ITP request that will allow the aircraft to enter 
dangerous weather conditions. 
 
B.10.3.5 ITP FC Requirements 
 
[1.23]  
ITP FC shall assess that an ITP is desirable and that a normal FL change is not possible 
prior to issuing an ITP request ([C.5], STPA-FC.1) 
[1.23.1]  
ITP FC must be provided a mechanism for obtaining local weather and turbulence 
information, and must factor this information into the decision to request ITP ( 
STPA-FC.1) 
 
 82
[1.24]  
ITP FC shall verify that all ITP criteria are met prior to issuing the request ([SC-FC.2],  
STPA-FC.1, [2.1]) 
 
[1.25]  
ITP FC shall verify the local contingency procedures prior to requesting ITP (  STPA-
FC.4) 
 
[1.26]  
If FC receives a clearance unexpectedly (too quickly or prior to finishing the request), 
they must not accept clearance and must contact ATC for clarification ([SC-FC.7], 
STPA-ATC.2) 
 
[1.27]  
ITP FC shall verify that all ITP criteria are met after receiving clearance and immediately 
prior to initiating FL change ([SC-FC.8],  STPA-FC.1, [2.5]) 
[1.27.1]  
ITP FC must not re-evaluate ITP criteria after beginning the FL change (  
STPA-FC.4) 
 
[1.28]  
ITP FC must not initiate an ITP FL change before receiving an ATC clearance ([SC-
FC.1], B.11:  STPA-FC.2, [2.5]) 
 
[1.29]  
The window of time between ATC clearance and ITP execution shall be less than TBD20 
minutes ([SC-FC.8], B.11:  STPA-FC.2) 
 
[1.29.1]  
ITP FC shall track how much time has passed since clearance was given (B.11:  
STPA-FC.2) 
 
[1.30]  
ITP FC must complete the maneuver specified in the ATC clearance ([SC-FC.3], B.11:  
STPA-FC.2) 
                                                 
20DO312suggests5minutes,butthisnumbershouldbeverified
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[1.31]  
ITP FC must promptly alert ATC of any abnormal conditions encountered during 
maneuver (STPA-ATC.1,STPA-ATC.3) 
 
[1.32]  
ITP FC must immediately confirm established FL with ATC upon completion of ITP 
maneuver ( STPA-FC.1, [2.9]) 
 
[1.32.1]  
After establishing new FL, ITP FC must obtain a new clearance from ATC for any 
further FL change (  STPA-FC.4) 
 
[1.33]  
ITP FC must be trained how to assess local traffic during ITP maneuver,  
 
[1.33.1] ITP must monitor nearby traffic while performing maneuver (B.11:  
STPA-FC.2,B.12   STPA-FC.3, [2.7],[2.8],[2.9]) 
 
[1.33.2]  
ITP FC must only use local traffic information from official sources during 
maneuver (  STPA-FC.4) 
 
[1.33.3]  
ITP FC must use additional situational awareness (such as TCAS) during ITP 
maneuver, and must act on any alerts (B.12   STPA-FC.3) 
 
[1.33.4]  
ITP FC must initiate an abnormal termination of ITP without delay when they 
believe they will enter a hazardous situation (B.12   STPA-FC.3, [2.8]) 
 
[1.33.5]  
ITP FC must not initiate an abnormal termination of ITP if the FC is not in a 
hazardous situation ([SC-FC.5],B.12   STPA-FC.3, [SC-FC.5]) 
 
 
[1.34]  
ITP FC must only use ITP equipment to determine if a FL change is feasible and to 
collect the necessary data to transmit to local ATC ( STPA-FC.1) 
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Rationale: ITP Equipment is designed for the sole purpose of the InTrail Procedure and 
should not be used for other requests or maneuvers. 
[1.34.1]  
ITP equipment must not be used during the procedure; once the ITP FC begins the 
FL change, ITP should not be used to assess nearby traffic 
Rationale: The ITP and Reference aircraft will necessarily violate procedural 
separation requirements (as well as the necessary starting conditions for ITP), and 
therefore the data should be disregarded. 
 
[1.35]  
ITP FC must follow contingency plan if communication fails. This constitutes either 
voice (HF) or datalink (CPDLC). (B.12   STPA-FC.3, [1.19]) 
 
[1.35.1]  
If using voice, during an ITP maneuver the ITP FC must verify every TBD 
minutes communication with ATC 
 
[1.35.2]  
If using datalink, during an ITP maneuver the ITP FC must verify that the data 
time stamp is within TBD minutes of request 
 
[1.35.3]  
ITP FC must follow regional contingencies if ATC is unresponsive to verification 
of communication through [1.35.1] or [1.35.2] 
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B.3.11  Hazard List and Hazard Log 
These are the high level hazards associated with ASTA-ITP. 
H1: A pair of controlled aircraft violate minimum separation standards 
Subsystem: ITP, reference, blocking aircraft; Air Traffic Controller; Flight Crew 
Operation/Phase: ITP Execution 
High-Level Causal Factors: 
ITP FC unaware of nearby traffic; 
  ATC unaware of traffic surrounding ITP aircraft; 
  Equipment Failure 
Level and Effect: Potential loss of life, equipment 
Safety Requirements and Constraints: 
System Safety Constraints 
 All ITP related protocols must not conflict or interfere with 
existing protocols [1.1] 
 Requesting and executing an ITP must not interfere with the FCs 
ability to monitor and attend to the health of their plane [1.1.1] 
 Receiving and providing clearance for ITP must not interfere with 
ATC ability to monitor and attend to the health of the airspace 
[1.1.2] 
 ITP shall provide the flight crews of aircraft operating in 
procedural airspace the ability to determine if an ITP maneuver is 
appropriate and the communication protocols [1.2] 
 ITP training shall be provided and include communication 
protocols (both channels and appropriate syntax) between flight 
crew and air traffic control [1.3.1] 
 ITP training shall be provided and include the expected order of all 
ITP related communications and methods for both ATC and FC to 
determine how to treat an out of order or unexpected 
communication [1.3.2] 
 ITP training shall be provided and include roles and 
responsibilities of each member of the ITP FC in executing the ITP 
procedure [1.3.3] 
 ITP training shall be provided and include conditions under which 
an abnormal termination of ITP should be initiated by the FC and 
by ATC [1.3.4] 
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 The ITP FC must be provided a means of determining their 
ownship climb / descend capability and clearance data [1.4]  
 ADS-B transponder on ITP aircraft must be certified and regularly 
tested [1.5] 
ITP Equipment 
 ITP equipment shall display information to the crew in a manner 
that does not distract or confuse them [1.6] 
 ITP equipment shall display all pertinent state data for nearby 
ADS-B aircraft [1.7] 
 ITP Equipment shall meet minimum reliability requirements when 
displaying calculated data fields [1.7.1] 
 ITP equipment shall display data quality indicators for all derived 
data 
 ITP equipment shall be used by the flight crew only to determine if 
a FL change is feasible and to collect the necessary data to transmit 
to local ATC [1.7.3] 
 ITP Equipment shall provide state data necessary to determine ITP 
feasibility to the flight crew in a clear and easy to understand 
interface [1.8] 
ATC 
 If ATC is not receiving status updates (e.g. at fix points) from any 
aircraft in sector, they must not issue ITP clearance [1.9] 
 Prior to issuing ITP clearance, ATC must verify that a normal 
flight level change is not possible [1.10] 
 If ATC is receiving data from a RA while ITP request is made (via 
normal fix point update or otherwise) they must wait for data from 
other aircraft prior to issuing ITP clearance [1.11] 
 Controllers must communicate details of details of ITP clearances 
granted (ITP aircraft and RA involved) in real time to other 
controllers in the same or nearby sectors [1.12] 
 ATC must request information missing from ITP request from FC 
prior to issuing ITP clearance [1.13] 
 ATC must verify all data prior to issuing an ITP clearance. ATC 
must “sanity check” other data to ensure that it is realistic [1.14] 
 ATC must monitor aircraft in their sector and know the flight plans 
for those aircraft, and if ATC believes requests are inconsistent 
with the ATC’s data then they must not grant ITP clearance [1.15] 
 ATC must have access to current  knowledge of the state data of 
all aircraft involved in ITP request, both the requesting aircraft as 
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well as any potentially blocking aircraft, including position, 
velocity, flight level and other aircraft states [1.16] 
 ITP must not use any assumptions about the future state of the 
airspace when granting ITP clearance [1.16.1] 
 ATC must grant clearance for ITP within TBD minutes of request 
[1.17] 
 ATC must be provided a mechanism for knowing how much time 
has elapsed since the ITP request was made [1.17.1] 
 ATC must be provided with all ITP criteria values [1.18] 
 ATC shall follow a contingency plan if communications with FC 
fail [1.19] 
 ATC must not approve additional ITP maneuvers until existing 
ITP has been completed and confirmed through formal 
communication channel [1.19.1] 
 ATC shall request communication with ITP FC if confirmation has 
not been received within TBD minutes [1.19.2] 
 ATC shall request procedural separation for all aircraft domain 
until communication verification has been received from ITP FC 
[1.19.3]  
 ATC shall prioritize communication with an aircraft performing an 
ITP maneuver over other aircraft not maneuvering [1.20] 
 ATC shall relate all pertinent traffic and safety information 
promptly to ITP FC [1.20.1] 
 ATC shall continue to monitor ITP aircraft and surrounding 
aircraft (such as RA) while ITP maneuver is in progress [1.21] 
 If ATC notices a potentially hazardous traffic scenario, they must 
assess if an abnormal termination of the ITP maneuver is 
necessary, and initiate it if so [1.22] 
 ATC must determine when traffic surrounding an ITP maneuver 
may enter into a hazardous state such as inclement weather of 
violation of procedural airspace constraints [1.22.1] 
 If ATC is using traffic data from multiple sources to monitor 
traffic surrounding an ITP maneuver, they must have a clearly 
defined hierarchy of which data to use [1.22.2] 
 ATC must not issue abnormal termination commands without 
cause [1.22.3] 
 If ATC becomes aware of a mistake made during the original ITP 
clearance, they must assess if the mistake could be hazardous prior 
to terminating the ITP [1.22.4] 
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 ATC must not approve an ITP request that will allow the aircraft to 
enter dangerous weather conditions [1.22.5] 
Flight Crew 
 ITP FC shall assess that an ITP is desirable and that a normal FL 
change is not possible prior to issuing ITP request [1.23] 
 ITP FC must have a mechanism for obtaining local weather and 
turbulence information, and must factor this information into the 
decision to request ITP [1.23.1] 
 ITP FC shall verify that all ITP criteria are met prior to issuing the 
request [1.24] 
 ITP FC shall verify the local contingency procedures prior to 
requesting ITP [1.25] 
 If FC receives a clearance unexpectedly (too quickly or prior to 
finishing request), they must not accept clearance and must contact 
ATC for clarification [1.26] 
 ITP FC shall verify that all ITP criteria are met after receiving 
clearance and immediately prior to initiating FL change [1.27] 
 ITP FC must not re-evaluate ITP criteria after beginning FL 
change [1.27.1] 
 ITP FC must not initiate an ITP FL change before receiving an 
ATC clearance [1.28] 
 The window of time between ATC clearance and ITP execution 
shall be less than TBD  minutes [1.29] 
 ITP FC shall track how much time has passed since clearance was 
given  [1.29.1] 
 ITP FC must complete the maneuver specified in the ATC 
clearance [1.30] 
 ITP FC must promptly alert ATC of any abnormal conditions 
encountered during maneuver [1.31] 
 ITP FC must immediately confirm established FL with ATC upon 
completion of ITP maneuver [1.32] 
 After establishing new FL, ITP FC must obtain a new clearance 
from ATC for any further FL change [1.32.1] 
 ITP FC must be trained how to assess local traffic during ITP 
maneuver [1.33] 
 ITP must monitor nearby traffic while performing maneuver 
[1.33.1] 
 ITP FC must only use local traffic information from official 
sources during maneuver [1.33.2] 
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 ITP FC must use additional situational awareness (such as TCAS) 
during ITP maneuver, and must act on any alerts [1.33.3] 
 ITP FC must initiate an abnormal termination of ITP without delay 
when they believe they will enter a hazardous situation [1.33.4] 
 ITP FC must not initiate an abnormal termination of ITP if the FC 
is not in a hazardous situation [1.33.5]  
 ITP FC must only use ITP equipment to determine if a FL change 
is feasible and to collect the necessary data to transmit to local 
ATC [1.34] 
 ITP equipment must not be used during the procedure; once the 
ITP FC begins the FL change, ITP should not be used to assess 
nearby traffic [1.34.1] 
 ITP FC must follow contingency plan if communication fails. This 
constitutes either voice (HF) or datalink (CPDLC). [1.35] 
 If using voice, during an ITP maneuver the ITP FC must verify 
every TBD minutes communication with ATC [1.35.1] 
 If using datalink, during an ITP maneuver the ITP FC must verify 
that the data time stamp is within TBD minutes of request [1.35.2] 
 ITP FC must follow regional contingencies if ATC is unresponsive 
to verification of communication [1.35.3] 
 
Analyses Performed: 
Actions Taken: 
Status: 
Verification: 
Final Disposal (Closeout Status): 
Responsible Engineer: 
Remarks: 
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H2: Aircraft enters unsafe atmospheric region 
Assumption: This hazard does not need to be considered for ITP because no unsafe 
control action associated with ITP will lead to it.  System constraints to avoid this hazard 
are designed into basic flight protocol, and operate independently of ITP. 
 
H3: Aircraft enters uncontrolled state 
Assumption: This hazard does not need to be considered for ITP because no unsafe 
control action associated with ITP will lead to it.  System constraints to avoid this hazard 
are designed into basic flight protocol, and operate independently of ITP. 
 
H4: Aircraft enters unsafe attitude 
Assumption: This hazard does not need to be considered for ITP because no unsafe 
control action associated with ITP will lead to it.  System constraints to avoid this hazard 
are designed into basic flight protocol, and operate independently of ITP. 
 
H5: Aircraft enters a prohibited area 
Assumption: This hazard does not need to be considered for ITP because no unsafe 
control action associated with ITP will lead to it.  System constraints to avoid this hazard 
are designed into basic flight protocol, and operate independently of ITP. 
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B.3.12  Verification and Validation 
These requirements and constraints have not been independently verified and validated, 
which would be needed if they were to be used on the real system (instead of on this 
demonstration project).   
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B.4   Level 2: System Design Principles 
This level of the intent specification answers the question of “why” for all of the design 
decisions in level 3 and addresses some of the basic properties of system components that impact 
system design.  Additionally, this level will describe the derived requirements, or how the high 
level requirements in level 1 will be achieved while enforcing the constraints from level 1. 
B.4.1  ASTA-ITP System Components 
The components of ASTA-ITP that must be considered during the system design phase can 
be divided up into two categories: the new procedure for performing ITP and the additional 
equipment needed for the execution of the procedure. 
 
B.4.1.1   ITP Procedure 
The ITP procedure consists of the steps required for a correct ITP maneuver to occur.  Broadly 
speaking, these steps are the initiation of ITP, the evaluation of ITP, the execution of ITP and the 
completion of ITP.  There is also the step of abnormal termination of ITP, which will be the 
emergency procedure necessary to gracefully exit an ITP maneuver found to be unsafe while 
maintaining the highest possible level of safety. 
     The ITP procedure designed in this specification is not merely a checklist of steps for the 
flight crews and the air traffic controllers to follow.  It also encompasses requirements for 
training both the ITP flight crew and the air traffic controllers in how to perform ITP.   These 
training requirements cover not just the procedure itself but also the communication protocols 
that should be used for the procedure as well as the aforementioned emergency procedures. 
 
B.4.1.2   ITP Equipment 
The ITP equipment will be the equipment on board the ITP aircraft that is used specifically by 
the pilot to assess the feasibility and desirability of the ITP maneuver under consideration prior 
to initiating the request.  This equipment is passive equipment—that is it only displays 
information to the ITP flight crew; it does not offer advice or suggestions on a “correct” action to 
take. 
     Figure B.5 shows the design of the ITP equipment and all related interfaces, detailed in the 
accompanying key.  All of the ITP equipment design decisions in level 2 reflect decisions made 
about parts of this functional architecture. 
 
B.4.1.3   Data Environment and Assumptions 
ITP equipment depends on external data in order to calculate and display ITP criteria. This 
includes ADS-B under the aegis of the global navigation constellation, as well as barometric 
pressure data for altitude. This document is intended to specify requirements for ITP equipment 
and for the operators in the ITP domain. Therefore, this document does not specify certification 
requirements for external components but rather lists the expected inputs for the minimum 
expected ITP functionality. 
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Figure B.5  Surveillance Functional Architecture Scope for ASTA-ITP 
Key to Figure B.5: 
 IF-1 =  Encompasses the following: 
o Position sensor input interface, e.g., at sensor antenna, for Reference Aircraft 
o Sensor outputs for Reference Aircraft 
o Output from Surveillance Transmit Processing (STP) to the ADS-B Transmit function 
 IF-2 = Encompasses the following 
o Position sensor source input interface, e.g., at sensor antenna, for ITP Aircraft  
o Sensor outputs for ITP Aircraft 
 IF-3 = ADS-B link environment  
 IF-4 = ADS-B receive function, generating ADS-B reports for ITP equipment 
 IF-5 through IF-8 are specific to the manufacturer and operator implementation 
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B.4.2   System Design Principles 
 
B.4.2.1   Nature of ASTA-ITP Design Needs 
When considering how to design ASTA-ITP and what principles to incorporate in that 
design, it is important to note the unique nature of ASTA-ITP.  In essence, ASTA-ITP is the 
method to reduce separation requirements in a strictly defined scenario.  Because ASTA-ITP is 
essentially a method that must operate within an existing, strictly defined framework (SC1) and 
because the ITP equipment cannot do anything more than calculate and display state data about 
the system (1.3), much of the necessary design principles concern the implementation details as 
opposed to more traditional “design” issues.  Therefore the design consists of three basic 
categories: 1) Operator Task Design Principles consisting of the steps necessary for the flight 
crews and air traffic controllers to follow in order to safely execute the procedures; 2) Equipment 
Design Principles, which include the necessary items to be displayed to the flight crew during 
operations; and 3) Data Environment Design Principles and Assumptions, which account for 
inputs, such as ADS-B, that are essential for ITP Equipment to perform its functions. 
 
B.4.2.2   Overview of Concept of Operations 
Safe execution depends on situational awareness of the air space by flight crews and air 
traffic control, recognition of dynamically changing criteria, and coordinated communication 
between aircraft (flight crews) and air traffic control. Figure B.6B.6 shows the physical 
relationship between the components of the airspace in an example InTrail Procedure, with the 
three basic steps required for proper execution. DO-312 describes the purpose and design as 
follows: 
 
For a standard Flight Level change, the controller uses standard, procedure-based 
separation minima and procedures to ensure that separation will exist between an 
aircraft requesting a 
Flight Level change and all other aircraft at the initial, intermediate and requested Flight 
Levels. The ATSA-ITP was developed to enable either leading or following Same Track 
aircraft to perform a climb or descent to a requested Flight Level through Intervening 
Flight Levels that might otherwise be disallowed when using current standard separation 
minima. The ITP Equipment would allow the flight crew to determine if the criteria for an 
ITP request are met with respect to one or two Reference Aircraft at Intervening Flight 
Levels. The ITP Speed/Distance Criteria are designed such that the spacing between the 
estimated positions of the ITP Aircraft and Reference Aircraft, while the vertical 
separation is not achieved, is never less than the ITP Separation Minimum until vertical 
separation between the ITP Aircraft and Reference Aircraft is ensured. 
The ITP application uses GNSS/GPS/ADS-B data to apply distance based longitudinal 
separation. The ITP Operational Description can be found in IR.15. The probability of 
aircraft longitudinal overlap is calculated based on given values of accuracy for 
GNSS/ADSB, altitude error, latency error, initiation criteria parameters for the ITP, and 
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a wind model. A parametric analysis was performed in to determine the sensitivity of 
collision risk to accuracy, integrity and initiation criteria. 
 
 

Figure B.6  ATSA-ITP Concept 
 
 Stage 1 Initiation – Before the ITP maneuver, ITP criteria must be met. 
 Stage 2 Execution – During an ITP maneuver, the ITP longitudinal separation between 
aircraft is applied. 
 Stage 3 Completion – At final FL, procedural separation must exist with aircraft that are 
already at that final FL. 
Figure B.7 shows the further refinement of these steps. The flight crew initiates ITP by 
requesting it, the ATC verifies the request and, if the criteria are met, grants clearance, and then 
the flight re-verifies the criteria and executes 
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Figure B.7  Basic Step-by-Step Procedure for ITP Operators 
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B.4.3   Operator Task Design Principles 
This section describes the design principles associated with creating the operator tasks 
necessary to perform ITP.  Because the fundamental tasks (i.e. communication between the FC 
and ATC, granting clearance, and executing a clearance) are not new, the design principles here 
focus on the details of the procedures that the flight crew of the ITP aircraft and the air traffic 
controller will use to perform ITP. All of the modeling and development work used in the design 
of ITP are based on certain assumptions about operator (i.e. flight crews and air traffic 
controllers) behavior and order of operations. The design decisions presented below reflect 
these assumptions, as well as the mathematical modeling techniques used minimum separation. 
ITP Flight Crew 
 
[2.1] The ITP flight crew needs to check that the following criteria are fulfilled before 
requesting an ITP clearance. This requirement does not imply that an individual 
assessment of each criterion is carried out by the flight crew, but rather that each criterion 
is assessed by either the flight crew, or by automation (see section 3.5.1) and although not 
required for all criterion, it is recognized that automation may provide a more predictable 
solution. ([1.2], [1.8],[1.23],[1.24]) See also: DO312-SPR.1
 
[2.1.1] The Ownship climb/descend capability criteria will be considered passed 
if and only if the ITP Aircraft can climb/descend in the desired direction at a rate 
of 300 fpm or more. Initiation Distance Critera and other geometric values 
([2.1.2], [2.1.3], [2.1.4]) were selected such that when a Flight Level change at 300 
fpm is performed with the related 20 or 30 kts Closing Ground Speed Differential, 
the distance between the aircraft does not become less than the ITP Separation 
Minimum (i.e., 10 NM). See also: DO312-SPR.38 
 
[2.1.2] The ITP Speed/Distance Criteria will be considered passed if and only if 
one of the following are met (See also: DO312-SPR.39): 
- (ITP Distance  15 NM) and (Closing Ground Speed Differential  20 Kts) 
or
- (ITP Distance  20 NM) and (Closing Ground Speed Differential  30 Kts) 
 
[2.1.3] The Relative Altitude Criteria will be considered passed if and only if the 
difference in altitude between the ITP and Reference Aircraft is less than or equal 
to 3000 feet. Anything greater than this is considered standard, procedural 
airspace. See also: DO312-SPR.40 
Note: The flight crew/ITP Equipment does not have knowledge of the separation 
minima. It can only check if the Reference Aircraft is/are vertically 3000 feet or 
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less. ATC checks that the vertical distance is 3000 feet or less and that it is 2000 
feet or less when the separation minima is 2000 feet. 
 
[2.1.4] ITP Equipment data accuracy and quality must meet certain minimum 
requirements in order to ensure that the ITP Separation Minimum is applied within 
predictable certainty bounds. All of the geometric and aerodynamic calculations 
used to design the procedure assume a certain level of fidelity in the state data of 
all aircraft involved in the procedures. 
 
[2.1.4.1] The position accuracy data quality criteria will be considered 
passed only if the ITP Aircraft data AND Reference Aircraft data each 
have horizontal position accuracies of at least 0.5 NM at the 95th 
percentile. 
 
Note: To pass the position data quality criteria, both the accuracy and 
integrity requirements on the data from both ITP and Reference Aircraft 
must be met. SPR.43 provides the accompanying integrity requirement to 
pass this criteria. 
 
[2.1.4.2] The position integrity data quality criteria will be considered 
passed only if the ITP Aircraft data AND Reference Aircraft data each 
have horizontal position integrity bounds of 1.0 NM with an integrity 
level of 1E-5. 
 
Note: To pass the position data quality criteria, both the accuracy and 
integrity requirements on the data from both ITP and Reference Aircraft 
must be met. SPR.42 provides the accompanying accuracy requirement 
to pass this criteria. 
 
[2.1.4.3] The velocity data quality criteria will be considered passed only if 
the ITP Aircraft data AND Reference Aircraft data each have horizontal 
velocity accuracies of at least 10 m/s (19.4 kts) at the 95th percentile. 
 
[2.2] The ITP flight crew should include a minimum set of data in its ITP request, 
including the requested Flight Level and for each Reference Aircraft, its aircraft ID, ITP 
Distance and relative position (in front or behind). The Air Traffic Controller needs this 
information in order to have sufficient knowledge of the airspace. ([1.3.2],[1.24]) See 
also: DO312-SPR.20 
 
[2.3] The ITP flight crew will follow normal communication to acknowledge the 
clearance (via read back if using voice) to ATC to confirm that the clearance has been 
 99
received and has been received on-board the correct aircraft.( [1.3.2]) See also: DO312-
SPR.6 
 
[2.4] The ITP flight crew will only perform the ITP maneuver if the specifics provided 
by ATC in the ITP Clearance are consistent with the information included in the ITP 
request made by the ITP flight crew.( [1.3.2][1.26][1.27][1.28][1.30]) See also: DO312-
SPR.7 
 
Note: Any inconsistencies detected between the ITP Request and the ITP Clearance do 
not necessarily prohibit execution of an ITP maneuver, but may necessitate a reissue of 
the ITP request or other means to resolve the discrepancies between the Request and 
Clearance. 
 
[2.5] After receiving the ITP clearance the ITP flight crew will check that the following 
ITP Criteria are fulfilled before commencing an ITP maneuver: ([1.27]) 
- Criteria enumerated in ([2.1.2],[2.1.3],[2.1.4]) 
Note: Again, this design assumption does not imply that an individual assessment of 
each criterion is carried out by the flight crew, but rather that each criterion is assessed 
by either the flight crew, or by automation on a selected ADS-B transmitting aircraft (see 
section 3.5.1) and although not required for all criteria, it is recognised that automation 
may provide a more predictable solution. 
 
[2.6] The ITP flight crew will maintain the required Mach number during the ITP 
maneuver. This is levied based on mathematical calculations so the distance between the 
aircraft does not become less than the ITP Separation Minimum (i.e., 10 NM). [1.30] 
See also: DO312-SPR.9 
 
[2.7] During an ITP maneuver, the ITP flight crew should not modify the ITP clearance 
based on the ITP Equipment. This means the flight crew shall conform to the provided 
clearance and complete the ITP maneuver to the assigned altitude unless there is a flight 
safety concern detected by the flight crew..( [1.27.1][1.30]) 
 
Note: This means the flight crew shall conform to the provided clearance and complete 
the ITP maneuver to the assigned altitude unless there is a flight safety concern detected 
by the flight crew. 
 
[2.8] The ITP flight crew must maintain a compliant climb/descent rate. This is again a 
mathematical consideration designed to ensure minimum separation distance during ITP. 
 
[2.8.1] If during an ITP maneuver the ITP flight crew detects that the 
climb/descent rate is not compliant, the crew should attempt to rectify the 
 100
deficiency. ([1.30]) See also: DO312-SPR.11 
 
[2.8.2] If during an ITP maneuver, it is not possible to perform the ITP 
climb/descent, the ITP flight crew should follow regional contingency procedures. 
([1.3.4],[1.33.4]) See also: DO312-SPR.12 
 
[2.9] If the ITP flight crew detects a condition where the distance between the ITP and 
Reference Aircraft is reduced such that a significant reduction in safety or potential mid 
air collision is possible, the ITP flight crew will follow regional contingency procedures. 
([1.3.4],[1.33.4]) See also: DO312-SPR.13 
 
Note: Although not required, automation could be used to improve the FC awareness of 
any significant reduction in ITP Distance as discussed in B.5.2. 
 
[2.10] If a confirmation message has not been received by ATC for an ITP clearance or a 
report for reaching a Flight Level, ATC will contact the flight crew. ([1.32.1], [1.35])  
See also: DO312-SPR.14 
 
[2.11] If during the “reaching Flight Level” report ATC detects that the ITP Aircraft has 
leveled off at the wrong Flight Level or if at a position reporting point, ATC detects the 
aircraft at the wrong Flight Level, ATC will contact the aircraft immediately. ([1.32.1], 
[1.35]) See also: DO312-SPR.15 
 
Air Traffic Control 
 
[2.12] ATC should check the ITP request for compliance with the following criteria 
before granting an ITP clearance. These mathematical constraints on the system are 
intended to ensure a desired minimum separation between aircraft, and these are the same 
criteria that the flight crew must verify ([1.9],[1.10],[1.13],[1.15],[1.16], [2.1]) 
 
- ITP Distance sent in the ITP request equal or greater than 15 nautical miles. 
- Closing Mach Differential equal or less than 0.04 Mach. 
- Reference Aircraft not maneuvering and not expected to maneuver during ITP. 
- Maximum vertical distance between the ITP and Reference Aircraft of: 
            - 3000 ft if the required vertical separation minima is 1000 ft, or 
            - 2000 ft if the required vertical separation minima is 2000 ft 
- ITP and Reference Aircraft are Same Track aircraft. 
- ITP Request message format is correct, i.e., proper phraseology and information is 
included. 
 101
 
Note: The Same Track criterion is not the same as the Similar Track criterion that is 
checked by the ITP Aircraft flight crew. Same Track includes the concept of Similar 
Track but also includes a check on whether or not the aircraft track protection areas 
overlap (which can only be known by the controller). For more information see the 
definitions list in 3.2 or Annex A. 
Note: The controller is still responsible for ensuring there are no other aircraft 
involved. 
 
[2.13] ATC should not permit an aircraft to be an ITP Aircraft and a Reference Aircraft 
for another ITP operation at the same time. ATC may allow an aircraft to be a Reference 
Aircraft for two distinct ITP operations if this aircraft is at the same time leading for one 
ITP operation and following for another. One of the assumptions in the design of this 
procedure is that the Reference Aircraft is not maneuvering during an ITP 
([1.15],[1.16]) See DO312-SPR.4
 
[2.14] ATC should include a minimum data set in its clearance, in order to minimize the 
risk of confusion during communication between the Flight Crew and ATC. This 
information includes the Reference Aircraft ID and the cleared-to Flight Level in the ITP 
clearance.( [1.3.1]) See also: DO312-SPR.5
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B.4.3  Equipment Design Principles 
This section describes the design principles that will be incorporated in the design of the on 
board ITP equipment.  These principles are also enumerated with more detail in DO-312, with 
the additional traceability to level 1 and 3 principals added here. This section includes the 
minimum set of data required to safely execute the ITP, i.e. maintain a minimum separation 
distance, based on a mathematical model produced in DO-312. This performance model and its 
associated collision risk model assume certain initial conditions and aerodynamic performance 
characteristics necessary to achieve a desired flight geometry. These assumptions are captured 
as design decisions below. 
[2.15] The values of the following information elements will be displayed to the ITP 
flight crew. These are the components of the ownship/reference relative state vector 
necessary to ensure minimum separation during ITP. These data are based on the 
Collision Risk Model and associated design laid out in DO-312.  ([1.8]) See also 
DO312-SPR.18 
Note: Although not required from the safety and performance analyses, there is a strong 
preference amongst regulatory and certification authorities that Ground Speed and 
Relative Track Angle are also displayed to the flight crew. 
- Aircraft ID of Reference Aircraft 
- ITP Distance 
- Reference Aircraft Relative Altitude 
- Leading or Following climb or descent information with respect to the Reference 
Aircraft 
 
[2.15.1] The ITP Distance will be calculated by the ITP Equipment. ([1.8]) See 
also DO312-SPR.17 
 
[2.15.2] The Ground Speed Differential will be calculated by the ITP Equipment. 
([1.6],[1.7]) See also DO312-SPR.17 
 
[2.15.3] The relative track angle between the tracks of the Reference Aircraft and 
the ITP Aircraft will be calculated by the ITP Equipment. ([1.6],[1.7]) See also 
DO312-SPR.27 
 
[2.15.4] When Ground Speed Differential is displayed it must be with an 
unambiguous indication of whether or not it represents a situation where the 
aircraft are closing on each other (the distance is being reduced). 
([1.1.1],[1.6],[1.7]) See also DO312-SPR.20 
 
[2.16] The capability to assess whether the values of the following information elements 
pass the ITP Initiation Criteria will be provided to the ITP flight crew: ([1.7]) 
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- Criteria enumerated in ([2.1.2],[2.1.3],[2.1.4]) See also DO312-SPR.19 
 
Note: This assessment could be carried out by ITP Equipment automation functions 
(leading to a pass/fail being passed to the flight crew), or by the flight crew (leading to 
the information element values being passed to the flight crew). 
 
[2.16.1] The ITP Distance displayed to the flight crew must indicate a passed 
Initiation Criteria only when the calculated distance also passes the criteria (i.e., 
rounding or other means do not cause displayed data to indicate a passed criteria 
when it was calculated to fail). ([1.6],[1.7]) See also DO312-SPR.17 
 
[2.16.2] The ITP Equipment will provide the ability to assess whether the accuracy 
and integrity of the surveillance data provided by the Reference Aircraft as well as 
the position and velocity data of the ITP Aircraft are of a sufficient level for the 
execution of an ITP maneuver.  ([1.6],[1.7])  See DO312-SPR.26 
[2.16.3] Ground Speed Differential, if displayed to the flight crew, will indicate a 
passed Initiation Criteria only when the calculated differential also passes the 
criteria (i.e., rounding or other means do not cause displayed data to indicate a 
passed criteria when it was calculated to fail).  ([1.6],[1.7])  See also DO312-
SPR.25 
 
[2.16.4] For implementations that indicate whether or not the ITP initiation criteria 
(ITP Distance, Ground Speed Differential, and Similar Track status) are satisfied, 
such indication(s) must shall be clear and unambiguous. ([1.1.1],[1.6],[1.7]) See 
also DO312-SPR.21 
 
Note: In the requirement above, the term “Clear and Unambiguous” refers to the 
perception of the user, e.g., as verified in line with CS/FAR25-1309 [35], [36] or 
similar assessments. 
 
[2.17] The Total Receive Aircraft Domain Uncompensated Latency of Received position 
(from interface D to the input of the ITP Distance calculation) shall not exceed 1.575 
seconds. ([1.7.3]) See also DO312-SPR.36 
 
[2.18] The Total Receive Aircraft Domain Uncompensated Latency of ownship position 
(from interface A2 to the input of the ITP Distance calculation) shall not exceed 4.575 
seconds. ([1.7.3]) See also DO312-SPR.37 
 
[2.19] The Ownship climb/descend capability criteria will be considered passed if and 
only if the ITP Aircraft can climb/descend in the desired direction at a rate of 300 fpm or 
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more. ([1.2], [2.1]) See also DO312-SPR.38 
 
[2.20] The ITP Speed/Distance Criteria will be considered passed if and only if one of 
the following are met: ([1.2], [2.1]) See also DO312-SPR.39 
- (ITP Distance  15 NM) and (Closing Ground Speed Differential  20 Kts) 
or
- (ITP Distance  20 NM) and (Closing Ground Speed Differential  30 Kts) 
 
[2.21] The Relative Altitude Criteria will be considered passed if and only if the 
difference in altitude between the ITP and Reference Aircraft is less than or equal to 3000 
feet. ([1.2], [2.1]) See also DO312-SPR.40 
Note: The flight crew/ITP Equipment does not have knowledge of the separation 
minima. It can only check if the Reference Aircraft is/are vertically 3000 feet or less. ATC 
checks that the vertical distance is 3000 feet or less and that it is 2000 feet or less when 
the separation minima is 2000 feet. 
 
[2.22] The Similar Track Criteria will be considered passed if and only if the difference 
in track angles between the ITP and Reference Aircraft is less than ±45°. : ([1.2], 
[2.1]) See also DO312-SPR.41 
 
[2.23] The position accuracy data quality criteria shall be considered passed only if the 
ITP Aircraft data AND Reference Aircraft data each have horizontal position accuracies 
of at least 0.5 NM at the 95th percentile. : ([1.2], [2.1]) See also DO312-SPR.42 
Note: To pass the position data quality criteria, both the accuracy and integrity 
requirements on the data from both ITP and Reference Aircraft must be met. SPR.43 
provides the accompanying integrity requirement to pass this criteria. 
 
[2.24] The position integrity data quality criteria shall be considered passed only if the 
ITP Aircraft data AND Reference Aircraft data each have horizontal position integrity 
bounds of 1.0 NM with an integrity level of 1E-5.  : ([1.2], [1.7.1], [2.1]) See also 
DO312-SPR.43 
Note: To pass the position data quality criteria, both the accuracy and integrity 
requirements on the data from both ITP and Reference Aircraft must be met. SPR.42 
provides the accompanying accuracy requirement to pass this criteria. 
 
[2.25] The velocity data quality criteria shall be considered passed only if the ITP 
Aircraft data AND Reference Aircraft data each have horizontal velocity accuracies of at 
least 10 m/s (19.4 kts) at the 95th percentile. ([1.2], [2.1]) See also DO312-SPR.44 
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B.4.4   Data Environment Design Principles and Assumptions 
This section describes the principles associated with the interoperability between the ATSA-
ITP application ADS-B data. This section does not specify anything pertaining to the 
certification of ADS-B and other surveillance equipment. Rather, it specifies the types of data 
that are expected in order for all of the elements of ATSA-ITP to operate effectively and safely. 
[2.26] The following ownship data items will be provided to the ITP Equipment. These 
are the components of the ownship state vector necessary to ensure minimum separation 
during ITP. These data are based on the Collision Risk Model and associated design laid 
out in DO-312. ([1.8], [2.15]) See also: DO312-SPR.16 
- Horizontal Velocity 
- Horizontal Velocity Accuracy 
- Horizontal Position 
- Horizontal Position Accuracy 
- Horizontal Position Integrity Containment Bound 
- Barometric Altitude 
 
[2.27] The following ownship data items will also be available to the ITP flight crew for the 
reason outlined above: ([1.8], [2.15]) See also DO312-SPR.17 
Note: This information could be provided to the flight crew by either the ITP 
Equipment or through other means. 
- Vertical speed 
- Information to determine available climb/descent performance at the current cruise 
Mach number 
- Mach number 
 
[2.28] The following ADS-B parameters will be sent from the Transmit Aircraft Domain: 
([1.2], [2.1]) See also DO312-IR.1 
- Identity  
- Horizontal Position  
- Vertical Position 
- Horizontal 
- Velocity 
- Surveillance Quality Indication (of whether the surveillance quality of a particular 
aircraft is acceptable for the various functions of ATSA-ITP) 
 
More specific requirements on each data parameter are specified in the following 
subsections.
Upon receipt of the transmitted data, the Receive Aircraft Domain must properly 
associate the data and present it to the ITP Equipment for processing. 
 
[2.29] The Receive Aircraft Domain will be able to receive, from an eligible Transmit 
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Aircraft Domain, ADS-B messages containing at least the elements which enable the 
avionics to format the required ADS-B Surveillance Reports and associate the 
surveillance data with ownship surveillance data. See also DO312-IR.2 
 
 
[2.30] The Transmit Aircraft Domain will transmit the 24 bit aircraft address within each 
ADS-B message. See also DO312-IR.3 
 
 
[2.31] The Transmit Aircraft Domain will transmit an ADS-B message containing the 
aircraft identification. See also DO312-IR.4 
 
 
[2.32] In order to maintain consistency and interoperability with existing aircraft and other 
aircraft in the domain, the definitions will align with international standards. As per 
ICAO Doc. 4444, the following definitions will be applied by the Transmit Aircraft 
Domain: ([2.28] see also DO312-IR.5) 
- (Chapter 1, Definitions) Aircraft Identification is ‘a group of letters, figures or a 
combination thereof which is either identical to, or the coded equivalent of, the aircraft 
call sign to be used in air-ground communications, and which is used to identify the 
aircraft in ground-ground air traffic services communications’, 
- (Appendix 2, 2.2) one of the following aircraft identifications, not exceeding 7 
characters: 
-- the ICAO designator for the aircraft operating agency followed by the flight 
identification (e.g., KLM511, NGA213, JTR25) when in radiotelephony the call sign to 
be used by the aircraft will consist of the ICAO telephony designator for the operating 
agency followed by the flight identification (e.g., KLM511, NIGERIA 213, HERBIE 25); 
or 
-- the registration marking of the aircraft (e.g., EIAKO, 4XBCD, N2567GA). 
 
 
[2.32.1] The Transmit Aircraft Domain will transmit horizontal position 
information (i.e., latitude, longitude) referenced to WGS-84. 
 
 
[2.32.2] The Receive Aircraft Domain will interpret received horizontal position 
information (i.e., latitude, longitude) as referenced to WGS-84. 
 
 
[2.32.3] The Transmit Aircraft Domain will transmit an indication of quality for 
the horizontal position information. 
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[2.32.4] The indicators used will be either Navigation Integrity Category (NIC), 
Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACP) and Surveillance Integrity 
Level (SIL) as specified in DO-242A or Navigation Uncertainty Category for 
Position (NUCP) as specified in DO-242. 
 
[2.32.4.1] As opposed to a single quality parameter, the Transmit Aircraft 
Domain should send accuracy and integrity as independent items (as 
defined per DO-242A). 
 
[2.32.5] When NACP and NIC are transmitted, the Transmit Aircraft Domain 
function will determine NACP based upon Horizontal Figure of Merit (HFOM) (or 
equivalent) and NIC based upon on Horizontal Protection Limit (HPL) (or 
equivalent) 
 
[2.32.6] When NUCP is transmitted, the Transmit Aircraft Domain function will 
determine NUCP based upon HPL or equivalent 
 
[2.32.6.1] When the position data source is Global Navigation Satellite 
System (GNSS), then use of DO-208 RAIM calculations to determine HPL 
is acceptable as a minimum. However, NUCP/NIC values should be 
determined using HPL values based on DO- 229D, DO-253B, or DO-310 
GNSS receivers RAIM methodology or equivalent when feasible. 
 
[2.32.6.2] When the position data source is GNSS, the NACP values should 
be determined using the HFOM output from DO-208 or a DO-229D, DO-
253B, or DO-310 GNSS receivers or equivalent. 
 
[2.32.7] When the Transmit Aircraft Domain cannot calculate SIL, the value of 
SIL will reflect the minimum integrity of the measurement integrity and the 
system integrity. 
 
[2.32.8] For position sources with software design assurance of at least Level C 
per DO- 178B/ED-12B and hardware design assurance of at least Level C per DO-
254/ED-80 or equivalent a system integrity corresponding to SIL 2 is accepted, for 
others SIL will be set to ZERO (0). 
 
[2.32.9] A distinction between NUCP and NIC/NACP/SIL airborne 
implementations will be provided by the Transmit Aircraft Domain (e.g., a link-
specific defined version number). 
 
[2.32.10] The Transmit Aircraft Domain will transmit pressure altitude 
 
[2.32.10.1] Neither Gilham altitude encoders nor altitude sources with a 
resolution less than or equal to 7.62 m (25 ft) should be used by aircraft 
implementations. 
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[2.32.11] The Receive Aircraft Domain will interpret received Ground Velocity 
information as referenced to WGS-84. 
 
[2.32.12] The Transmit Aircraft Domain will transmit Ground Velocity information 
as referenced to WGS-84. 
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B.5    Level 3: Blackbox Behavior 
This level describes the simple blackbox behavior of each component of the system.  “Blackbox 
behavior” means that each component is considered to be a blackbox: we will describe the 
inputs into the component, and the outputs produced by the component, but do nothing to 
describe the inner workings of the component—those details are held inside of the blackbox and 
out of scope of this level. 
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B.5.1   ITP Equipment 
The blackbox behavior of the ITP equipment will be described further in the final document, 
using the parameters below for the SpecTRM model. The tables represent the limited set of ITP 
Distance only, as compared to the full set of ITP parameters (velocity, closing velocity, data 
quality, etc) laid out in DO-312. 
Fundamental Goals of ITP equipment 
1. Display ITP data – ([G.1],[G.2],[G.3]) (required) 
2. Display other flight data (optional) 
  
____________________________  
Outputs 
1. ITP Distance Display – ([1.8][2.15]) 
2. Ground Speed Differential Display 
3. Data Quality Passes Display 
4. Data Quality Fails Display 
5. Relative Track Angle Similar Track Status Display 
6. Reference AC ID Display 
7. Data Input Error Display 
8. ITP Criteria Display Output ([1.7][2.15]) 
 
Modes 
1. ITP Supervisor 
2. ITP Display Mode 
 
States 
1. Reference AC Data State 
2. ITP AC Data State 
3. Data Quality State 
 
Functions 
1. ITP Distance Function 
2. Ground Speed Differential Function 
3. Relative Track Angle Function 
4. Intersection Point Function 
 
Inputs 
1. Display Mode Input 
2. Reference AC Horizontal Position ([2.32])  
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3. Reference AC Horizontal Position Accuracy 
4. Reference AC Horizontal Position Integrity 
5. Reference AC Surveillance Integrity Level 
6. Reference AC Ground Speed 
7. Reference AC Ground Speed Accuracy 
8. Reference AC Barometric Altitude 
9. Reference AC Track 
10. Reference AC ID 
11. ITP AC Horizontal Position 
12. ITPAC Horizontal Position Accuracy 
13. ITP AC Horizontal Position Integrity 
14. ITP AC Ground Speed 
15. ITP AC Ground Speed Accuracy 
16. ITP AC Barometric Altitude 
17. ITP AC Track 
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Figure B.8  ITP Equipment Model Visualization 
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B.5.2   Air Traffic Controller 
The blackbox behavior of the Air Traffic Controller is described herein.  This models the 
expected behavior of human operators given certain conditions, and represents a formal 
means for validating the procedural steps detailed in Levels 1 and 2. 
Fundamental Goals of Air Traffic Controller 
1. Approve ITP if criteria are met – ([SC-ATC.1]) 
2. Deny ITP if criteria are not met 
 
____________________________  
Outputs 
1. Approve ITP 
2. Deny ITP 
 
States 
1. ITP Criteria State 
2. Flight Crew Request State 
 
Inputs (from user: ITP Flight Crew) 
1. ITP Criteria Input 
2. Flight Crew Request 
3. Blocking Aircraft and Environment 
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Figure B.9  Air Traffic Control Model Visualization 
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B.5.3   ITP Flight Crew 
The blackbox behavior of the ITP Flight Crew is described herein.  This models the 
expected behavior of human operators given certain conditions, and represents a formal 
means for validating the procedural steps detailed in Levels 1 and 2. 
Fundamental Goals of Air Traffic Controller 
1. Perform ITP when criteria are met – ([SC-FC.2],[SC-FC.3]) 
2. Execute normal flight operations safely 
 
____________________________  
Outputs 
1. Execute ITP Command 
2. Request ITP to ATC 
3. Transmit ITP Criteria 
 
Modes 
1. ITP Supervisor Mode 
2. ITP Control Mode 
 
States 
1. ITP Criteria State 
2. ATC Response State 
 
Inputs 
1. ITP Criteria Input 
2. ATC Response 
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Figure B.10  ITP Flight Crew Model Visualization 
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